

***Research on the effectiveness of Police  
practice in reducing residential burglary  
Report 5***

**Case study of the  
Rotorua Police Area**

**Tanya Segessenmann and Karen Johns**

**December 2005**



## **Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary**

- Report 1: *Surveys of Household Burglary part one (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 2: *Surveys of Household Burglary part two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Dr Sue Triggs, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 3: *Literature review: Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Dr Sally Harvey, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 4: *Case study of the Manurewa Police Area*, Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 5: *Case study of the Rotorua Police Area*, Tanya Segessenmann and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 6: *Case study of the Lower Hutt Police Area*, Alison Chetwin and Helena Barwick, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 7: *Case study of the Sydenham Police Area*, Dr Sue Carswell and Karen Johns, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 8: *Victims of burglary*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 9: *Burglary offenders*, Garth Baker and Alison Gray, Ministry of Justice, 2005.
- Report 10: *Overview: Research on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary*, Alison Chetwin, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

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# Foreword

Burglary is a problem that considerably affects many New Zealand households. From victimisation surveys we know that it can have a profound effect on victims and that householders are concerned about it. Burglary is also costly both to government and to the New Zealand public. Reducing burglary is a key priority in government's Crime Reduction Strategy and an important outcome for the justice sector.

Although recorded burglary rates show a declining trend since the late 1990s, there is considerable room to achieve further reductions. The extensive research published here helps us understand what strategies might be effective in which contexts, as well as the reasons why they are effective. The research has revealed a wealth of practical and workable strategies and initiatives that can be shared from one Police Area to another.

The research project is the result of a highly productive collaboration between the Ministry of Justice and New Zealand Police. We are grateful for the substantial funding support for the project provided by the Cross Departmental Research Pool (CDRP) administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. In the spirit of the CDRP, it has been an excellent example of cross-departmental research on a subject of high priority to government.

The real commitment of the New Zealand Police to reducing crime is evident throughout the ten reports of the Burglary Reduction Research Programme. This substantial series of reports is published to be used in part or in its entirety by front-line Police, as well as managers, advisers and policy makers, all of whom play a variety of roles in the wider justice sector in the effort to reduce burglary.

Belinda Clark  
Secretary for Justice



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The Burglary Reduction Research Team: Alison Chetwin, Karen Johns, Tanya Segessenmann, Sue Carswell, Helena Barwick, Garth Baker, Alison Gray, Sue Triggs, and Sally Harvey



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## Abbreviations

AFIS	Automated Fingerprint Identification System
BRS	Burglary Reduction Strategy
CIB	Criminal Investigations Branch
Comms	North Communication Centre
CPTED	Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
CRS	Crime Reduction Strategy
CSA	Crime Scene Attendant
CYF	Child, Youth and Family Services
ESR	Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research
FGC	family group conference
GDB	General Duties Branch
Intel	intelligence
LES	Law Enforcement System
LET	Law Enforcement Team
LHOGM	Local Heads of Government Meeting
MO	modus operandi
NIA	National Intelligence Application (database replacing LES)
OC	Officer in Charge
OR	Offence Report

# Executive Summary

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Rotorua Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Manurewa, Lower Hutt and Sydenham

The evaluation involved an in-depth case study approach conducted in the four Police Areas from 2002 to 2004 in an attempt to discover which Police practices work in which contexts and through what mechanisms. The case studies involved:

- a community profile
- interviews with key respondents from the Police, the criminal justice sector and community organisations who had a knowledge of burglary
- Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004
- interviews with burglars and victims of burglary
- analysis of quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice.

## ***Community profile***

Rotorua Police Area had a population of 67,428 in the 2001 census. Most of the population resides in Rotorua city and suburbs and in communities around the lakes, as well as in rural forestry settlements such as Kaingaroa, Reporoa and Murupara. Of the residents in the Rotorua Police Area, 35.5% identified themselves as Maori, compared to 14.1% for New Zealand as a whole. When scored on the New Zealand Deprivation Index, Rotorua is placed in the most deprived 30% of all areas in New Zealand, but with wide variation between different communities.

## ***Police strategies***

Rotorua District developed a Crime Reduction Strategy in 2000 which included burglary reduction as one of its focus areas. This strategy promoted evidence-based and intelligence-led policing in its strategy. This required restructuring of resources such as the strengthening of intelligence sections throughout the District. It also required each Police Area in the District to introduce:

- a Strategic Section to immediately respond to new information or focus on identified crime problems
- Field Officers to provide follow-up from intelligence information and collect information for action on offenders
- Law Enforcement Teams (LETs) for Police Areas, rather than District-wide

- Crime Recorders (introduced in mid-2002) to complete officers' paperwork in order to free them for other duties.

Rotorua Police Area developed a Burglary Reduction Strategy (BRS), which was introduced in 2003. The main initiatives included in the BRS were to take proactive initiatives with 'hot' offenders, 'hot' locations, 'hot' victims and 'hot' property.

### ***Cross-focused initiatives***

Initiatives are grouped under those which focus on offenders, victims, locations and property. The first section of the report describes the initiatives which cross all those areas. This includes:

- tactical coordination
- intelligence
- LETs
- Field Officers
- Strategic Section.

The research found that lack of capacity (staff numbers and training) in Intel greatly reduced the effectiveness of proactive work until early 2004. The capacity for proactive work was hindered by staff not making it a priority, Strategic Section being used for backfilling frontline work, and the traditional offender focus remaining the main priority. New leadership in 2003 and provision of tactical managers with authority over General Duties Branch (GDB) staff began to have an impact by the end of 2004. The strengths of cross-focused initiatives were the protection from general duties and the great wealth of experience, particularly in the LET.

### ***Offender-focused initiatives***

Targeting high-risk offenders has been a key element in Rotorua's BRS. Targeting involves:

- analysing offenders to identify those at high risk of offending
- enforcing bail checks, warrants and parole conditions
- improving the resolution rate
- reducing youth offending.

Some specific initiatives were implemented, including 'Fifty-two pickup', which encouraged Police to concentrate on 52 top offenders, with one name being provided to two staff members for them to target through a range of means. Targeting provided staff with a focus for their patrols and an opportunity to compile more information on known offenders. It also provided an opportunity for Police to work together across their individual units to a common goal. One drawback noted by Police was that they felt that many of their offenders were 'off the radar' and therefore not yet known to them. Some commented that the emphasis needed to widen more to the other areas of focus such as 'hot' locations, victims and property.

Bail checks became a high priority for Rotorua Police with the introduction of the crime reduction strategy and BRS. The intensity with which Police undertook bail checks depended on staff levels, general workload and the priority supervisory staff gave it. Earlier in the research period the implementation of bail checks was variable, but the new Area Commander and senior management reinforced their significance. By the end of 2004, over 200 bail checks per week were being conducted and the results appeared to be positive.

Police encouraged offenders who were in custody to confess to burglaries for which they had not been apprehended, and then sought to gather as much information as they could about offenders' methods and crime habits. The rationale was to clear as many burglaries as possible to allow Police to concentrate on remaining burglaries, and it also helped them to build up a picture of the offender's modus operandi (MO), which would help them recognise further offences. The advantages were clear for youth offenders who were able to make a clean start before they faced the adult court. It also greatly enhanced the intelligence on offenders and their associates.

Rotorua Police had several initiatives around the collection of volunteer DNA samples. In 2002 they set targets for each quarter and actively sought voluntary DNA samples from known offenders and those in custody. They encouraged the voluntary collection of fingerprints from young offenders and sent Crime Scene Attendants (CSAs) to all burglary scenes in order to improve the collection of evidence. A drawback experienced by Rotorua Police was that they quickly exceeded their budget and had to cut back on DNA collection. With the introduction of the BRS, CSAs began attending all burglaries, with one person taking the offence reports (ORs) whilst the other collected forensic evidence. The effect of this was an increase in the quality of ORs and evidence collected, but it also led to increased delays in attendance as cases piled up. Attendance at burglaries was subsequently shifted back to GDB staff, who were then expected to call a CSA when forensic evidence was found.

### ***Location-focused initiatives***

Intel produced maps detailing the location of burglaries from the previous week, as well as an analysis of current MOs being identified and patterns of crime. This information was presented to weekly focus meetings and to the staff at daily briefings, where Intel would direct patrols. The benefits were:

- increasing the visibility of the Police in that area
- collection of information on known offenders' movements
- the opportunity to stop cars and impound vehicles from disqualified drivers—many of whom had been offenders
- the occasional opportunity to seize stolen property from burglars in transit.

Rotorua Police also worked closely with community patrols, with the District Council in analysing crime reduction through environmental design, and with Neighbourhood Support.

Rotorua Police stated that Neighbourhood Support was a key partner in their burglary reduction efforts, and hosted the Neighbourhood Support office within the station. Police reported that a high proportion of burglaries occurred outside Neighbourhood Support areas,

although the household surveys indicated that only 24% of respondents were members in 2002 and this had dropped to 18% in 2004.

### ***Victim-focused initiatives***

Rotorua Police traditionally relied heavily upon Victim Support to provide services to victims of crime, but in recent years Police had been exploring some other initiatives themselves which focused on crime prevention through target hardening. Target hardening measures are those which aim to deter crime through making the intended victim 'too hard' to reach.

A high proportion of Rotorua Victim Support's work was with burglary victims, and they had developed a booklet entitled *Reducing the risk of Burglary* which was part of the information packs distributed by officers attending the burglary. The target hardening programme was operated by Victim Support. This provided burglary victims who met certain criteria with help in securing their premises. The Police and Victim Support also undertook a project in a high crime neighbourhood which involved a house-to-house survey and pamphlet drop alerting residents about security issues.

### ***Property-focused initiatives***

Liaison with second-hand dealers was regarded by Rotorua Police as an important part of the strategy to reduce burglary. Members of the LET had the main responsibility for liaison, checking for stolen property, reminding dealers of their responsibilities and providing them with lists of known offenders. The liaison was said to work best when one person was responsible but this was not consistent during the various restructurings of the LET. Lack of reparation from the courts was noted by second-hand dealers as a barrier to working in cooperation with Police. Police were also concerned that people were not recording serial numbers of their property.

### ***General crime reduction initiatives***

Police were involved directly and with key partners in a range of activities which sought to reduce crime. Reduction in youth offending was a high priority and Police Youth and Community services provided a range of diversion programmes for the 200 youth offenders per year who came to their attention. Mana Social Services was a key partner with the Police, as were Te Arawa Trust Board and the Rotorua District Council. Police had undertaken truancy reduction initiatives and operated a youth development project. They worked with the District Council to implement a 'truancy-free CBD' and followed up with prosecution of parents for consistent truanting of children.

### ***Conclusions***

Rotorua's total crime per 10,000 population was higher than New Zealand as a whole and decreased by 0.9% between 1997 and 2004. Nationally, the crime rate per 10,000 population decreased by 20% in the same period.

Rotorua's dwelling burglary rate increased by 23% between 1997 and 2004, whereas the national dwelling burglary rate decreased by 31% in the same period. Looking more closely,

the burglary rate in Rotorua decreased in 2002 (by 10.2%), increased in 2003 (by 27%) and then decreased again in 2004 (by 10%).

These figures reflect the difficulties experienced by Rotorua in effectively implementing the BRS until late in 2003. Issues of leadership gaps, lack of Intel capacity, inability to sustain proactive measures and problems with internal data entry systems and staffing issues were all identified as barriers to the implementation.

By the end of 2003, a new District Commander was appointed, an Intel manager and new staff were appointed and trained, a tactical coordinator was given responsibility to deploy resources to address crime problems and proactive strategies were made a high priority for each shift and tied into the performance system. By mid-2004 these measures were being said to have an impact and were being reflected in the burglary rate decreasing again.



# 1 Introduction

The Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the New Zealand Police, has conducted research over three years (2002–2004) on the effectiveness of Police practice in reducing residential burglary. This case study report is the final report examining burglary initiatives undertaken in the Rotorua Police Area. Three other Police Areas in New Zealand are also part of the project—Manurewa, Lower Hutt and Sydenham

## 1.1 The objectives of the research

The objectives of the research are to:

- 1 examine Police best practice, including Police initiatives in partnership with communities, in relation to residential burglary reduction; to understand which practices are effective in which contexts and why
- 2 gain an understanding of some wider contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of burglary initiatives
- 3 examine effectiveness in relation to the incidence of burglary, the resolution of burglary, public satisfaction and perceptions of safety
- 4 examine any unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement.

## 1.2 The report

This report starts with a community profile to provide information about the Rotorua Area, as it was recognised that contextual factors are important to take into consideration when examining what works and how it works in a particular environment. The community profile gives an overview of demographic and geographical information and general crime in the Police Area.

Section 3 looks at Police structures and strategies for burglary reduction at the National, District and Area levels during the research period. Cross-focused initiatives, which utilise a number of approaches, are examined in Section 4. The rest of the report organises the burglary initiatives by their focus on offenders, victims, location or property. General crime prevention initiatives developed by the Police which have some impact on reducing potential burglaries are discussed in Section 9. Other crime prevention programmes operating in Rotorua are discussed in this section, as are relationships with key partners.

Section 10 provides an analysis of crime statistics for the Rotorua Police Area over the period of the research and compares Rotorua with New Zealand as a whole. Results from the

Household Burglary Survey (2002 and 2004) undertaken with 500 households in each of the four Police Areas are incorporated into the report.

Section 11 discusses the overall effectiveness of the Rotorua burglary reduction effort.

## **1.3 Evaluation methodology**

This section gives an overview of the methodology used for the evaluation.

### **1.3.1 Study design**

This evaluation aims to find out about effective burglary reduction initiatives in order to communicate best practice to Police and community partners. It was recognised that different environmental factors—such as demographics, geography, crime rate, community involvement, and local Police organisational structures—could impact on the development, implementation and effectiveness of burglary initiatives. The design therefore involved an in-depth case study approach to be conducted in four Police Areas over a period of three years (2002–2004).

This type of design is known as realistic evaluation, and was developed by researchers working on various crime prevention evaluations sponsored by the British Home Office in the 1990s.<sup>1</sup>

### **1.3.2 Police Area selection**

The four Police Areas were selected based on a scoping study conducted in 2001 that took into consideration the above environmental factors, what could be learned from each Area, and the Police Area's willingness to take part in the study. Police Areas with middle to high burglary rates and a range of different environmental factors representative of the majority of New Zealand were chosen so that lessons learned from these study sites would be informative for other Police Areas.

### **1.3.3 Conceptual framework for burglary reduction initiatives**

In any community, a range of initiatives is likely to be in place for the purpose of addressing and preventing burglary. Initiatives range from specific Police interventions, such as targeting offenders, to interventions delivered to victims, such as security advice, through to more generally-focused interventions, such as programmes for at-risk young people.

The conceptual framework for the evaluation organised particular initiatives under the following categories:

- 'hot' offenders: initiatives which targeted known burglars
- 'hot' victims: initiatives which aimed to increase the security of victims

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<sup>1</sup> Pawson, R. and Tilley, N. 1997. *Realistic Evaluation*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

- ‘hot’ locations: initiatives which involved targeted patrolling of locations with high burglary concentrations
- ‘hot’ property: initiatives which aimed to reduce the market for burgled goods and identify stolen property.

### **1.3.4 Information collection methods**

The study design included a range of information collection methods to examine the burglary initiatives in each Police Area and identify the mechanisms that led to burglary reduction. For example, enforcing bail conditions for known burglars might be expected to lead to a reduction in repeat offending through the mechanism of incapacitation. Using a range of methods allowed for verification of the results because if diverse kinds of data lead to the same conclusions, then more confidence can be placed in the validity and reliability of those conclusions.

The information collection methods for the current report included:

- *Community profile*
  - demographic and socio-economic data on each Area
  - general information on crime in the Area
  - identification of contextual factors, including risk and protective factors, that impacted on the incidence of burglary
- *Interviews*—semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with key respondents who had knowledge of burglary from:
  - the Police
  - the criminal justice sector
  - community organisations
- *Household Burglary Survey 2002 and 2004*—A face-to-face survey of one householder aged 16 years or older in 500 households was conducted in each of the Police Areas in both 2002 and 2004 to find out:
  - fear of crime
  - burglary victimisation
  - security measures people use
  - satisfaction with Police practice.
- *Quantitative data from New Zealand Police and the Ministry of Justice*—Data was analysed to assess the effectiveness of burglary initiatives by examining burglary rates in regards to incidents and resolution of burglary. Unintended effects of burglary initiatives, such as displacement to other Police Areas or types of offences, were examined.

### **1.3.5 Ethics and project management**

The evaluation proposal was submitted to the Justice Sector Research Group for ethical advice. The ethical standards of the Australasian Evaluation Society and the Association of Social Science Researchers have been followed. An advisory group consisting of

representatives of key stakeholder agencies provided advice on the design, conduct and management of the project and review of draft reports.


### **1.3.6 Reporting**

In addition to the area case studies, the full study includes reports on interviews with victims and offenders, Household Burglary Surveys in 2002 and 2004, a review of the international literature, and an overview report that analyses all information gathered over the three-year evaluation period.

## 2 Community profile

The Rotorua Police Area is located at the centre of the North Island in the Bay of Plenty, encompassing the provincial Rotorua city and surrounding rural areas, with four state highways running through the Area. The Rotorua Police Area incorporates most of the Rotorua District Council region and approximately half of the Whakatane District Council region, though only 10.8% of the Whakatane District's population resides in this Area.

**Figure 2.1: Location of the Rotorua Police Area in relation to the Local Territorial Authority areas**



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The majority of the Rotorua Police Area's population of 67,428<sup>2</sup> resides in Rotorua city and surrounding suburbs, with the remaining residents living around the lakes and in rural settlements such as Reporoa, Kaingaroa and Murupara. The area is thermally active and boasts many major lakes, including Rotorua, Rotoiti, and Tarawera. The lakes are surrounded

<sup>2</sup> New Zealand Census 2001.

by pastoral farmland and large areas of native and plantation forestry, such as the Kaingaroa and Whirinaki Forests and the Urewera National Park.

The Rotorua Police Area is known for its large Maori population, and is steeped in Maori culture. Many of the Maori residents are descendants of the Arawa tribe, although many are also affiliated with tribes from other New Zealand regions, such as Tauranga Moana/Mataatua, Te Tai Tokerau/Tamaki Makau Rau, Te Tairāwhiti, and Waikato. There are more than thirty active marae in the Area.

## **2.1 Census and other data**

Unless otherwise stated, population statistics discussed in this section are from the 2001 census, matched to the Rotorua Police Area boundary. Not all census data was available matched to Police Area boundaries. However, the Rotorua District Council has published census and New Zealand Deprivation index data matched to the council area, which encompasses at least 91.4% of the Rotorua Police Area's population, enabling this data to be used as a close approximation of the Rotorua Police Area.

Comments derived from Police and others interviewed in the research have been incorporated, as have the results from the Household Burglary Survey (2002 and 2004) undertaken with 500 households. These are found in the shaded boxes.

### **2.1.1 Population**

Of the residents in the Rotorua Police Area, 35.5% identified themselves as Maori, compared to 14.1% for New Zealand as a whole. The proportion of Maori residents in the Area is likely to increase, with 49.5% of those aged under seventeen being of Maori descent. In contrast, all the other ethnic groups in the Rotorua Police Area were in smaller proportions compared to New Zealand overall. However, the number of Pacific peoples in the Rotorua District Council Area had more than doubled since 1991.

The Rotorua Police Area had a larger proportion of the population under twenty-five years of age than nationally (39% versus 36.2%) and a lower proportion of older residents.

There was a relatively high rate of population turnover in the Rotorua District Council Area between 1996 and 2001. While 43.2% of residents had lived at their current address for five years or more, 56.8% had lived at their current address for less than five years, and 25.7% for less than a year.

### **2.1.2 Socio-economic status**

The New Zealand Deprivation Index, based on census data, is commonly used as an indicator of an area's socio-economic status. A score on the index is achieved through analysis of income, income support, employment status, qualifications, home ownership, access to motor vehicles and telephones, household occupancy and family type.

A score of ten on the Index indicates an area is among the most deprived 10% of all areas in New Zealand. The Rotorua District Council area's score was seven, placing it in the most deprived 30% of all areas in New Zealand, though variations in scores between different communities were evident.

### **2.1.3 Income**

Rotorua Police Area's distribution of income was similar to that for New Zealand as a whole, with Asian residents (35.2%), Maori (30.0%) and Pacific people (28.5%) overrepresented in terms of low income (less than \$10,001 per annum or a loss) and underrepresented in terms of high incomes (5.9%, 3.6% and 2.6% respectively of these ethnic groups earned more than \$50,000). These ethnic groups, however, are also overrepresented in the younger age groups, who typically earn less.

The proportions of the people of the Rotorua Police Area who received a form of government benefit were similar to the proportions of New Zealanders overall.

### **2.1.4 Employment**

In 2001 Rotorua Police Area had similar proportions of the population in full-time (43.0%) and part-time (12.7%) paid employment as New Zealand's total population, but had a higher proportion unemployed (6.0% versus 4.8%). When analysed by ethnicity, a relatively high proportion of Maori (11.9%) and Pacific people (10.5%) in the Rotorua Police Area were unemployed, in contrast to Asian residents (5.7%) and Europeans (3.3%).

The profile of occupations in the Rotorua District Council area was gradually changing, with a reduction in the percentage of residents working in the forestry, fishing and agriculture sectors, but an increase in professional, machine operators' and assemblers' occupations. Many respondents interviewed for this case study discussed the decline of well-paid manual labour jobs in the area, particularly in forestry, which had experienced a succession of redundancies, resulting in long-term unemployment for those without other skills or qualifications.

### **2.1.5 Qualifications**

Rotorua Police Area population was less qualified, on average, than New Zealand overall. The Rotorua Police Area had 26.2% of its population with no formal academic qualification, 2.5% more than that for New Zealand as a whole, although formal educational attainment in the Rotorua District Council area had improved between 1996 and 2001. A relatively high proportion of Maori (36.5%) and Pacific people (37.7%) in the Rotorua Police Area had no formal qualification, in contrast to Asian residents (13.1%) and Europeans (23.6%).

### **2.1.6 Household composition and family type**

The Rotorua Police Area had a total of 23,496 private occupied dwellings in 2001. Rotorua Police Area has a similar proportion of the population residing in one-family households (79.4%) as New Zealand as a whole, yet more residing in households with two or more families (5.6% versus 4.7%).

The Rotorua Police Area has a relatively high proportion of sole parent families (20.0%) in comparison to New Zealand as a whole (14.0%). The proportion of sole parent families in the Rotorua District Council area had increased since 1991.

### **2.1.7 Differences between communities**

Rotorua's ethnic populations were not evenly distributed through the Police Area. For example, while 35.5% of the Rotorua Police Area's population was Maori, this figure was 87.3% for the Murupara community. Similarly, 17.2% of Fordland's population were Pacific people, compared to 4.1% for the whole Police Area, and 6.8% of Lynmore's population was Asian, compared to 3.0% for the whole Police Area.

In addition, while the Rotorua District Council area's New Zealand Deprivation Index score was seven, Fordlands' score of ten places it in the most deprived 10% of all areas in New Zealand, while Lynmore's score of one places it in the least deprived 10% of all areas in New Zealand (i.e. 90% of all areas in New Zealand were more deprived).

## **2.2 Householders' perceptions of crime in Rotorua**

The majority of respondents interviewed for this case study felt the crime rate for Rotorua was high, with Police identifying dishonesty offences (particularly burglary and theft ex car), serious violence (particularly domestic violence), drugs, driving offences and disorder as their main crime concerns. Police reported that tourists were a large proportion of the victims of burglary and theft ex car.

### *Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

The Ministry of Justice commissioned TNS (formerly NFO) New Zealand to conduct household surveys during 2002 and 2004 in the Police Areas of Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt (Hutt City) and Sydenham (Spreydon/Heathcote). The survey asked about household burglaries over the period January 2001 (2003) to August/September 2002 (2004). Respondents were also asked about other aspects of crime and crime prevention.

In the 2002 Household Survey 18% of respondents thought there had been more crime in the past twelve months, while 12% thought there had been less; however, the majority thought the level of crime was about the same (48%) or had no opinion (19%). By 2004, only 14% of respondents thought there was more crime in the past twelve months, whilst 12% thought there had been less. Fifty-seven percent thought the level of crime was about the same. This was consistent with the decrease in the proportion of people who thought there was a local crime problem (from 18% to 15%).

### **2.2.1 Perceived risk factors for burglary offending**

All those interviewed were asked whether they perceived any particular groups in the community to be more at risk of being burglary offenders. Their answers included:

- younger people, including children
- men
- Maori
- school truants or non-enrolled young people
- gang members
- transients
- drug users
- people with alcohol dependence problems
- victims of crime, abuse or neglect
- people from families with a history of offending.

Some of these perceptions were confirmed by a scan of 211 burglary offenders dealt with by the Rotorua Police in 2001, which revealed that 92% were male, 82% were Maori, 25% were under 17 and a further 15% were between 17 and 22.

In 2004, a Rotorua Police officer interviewed 11 burglars held in overnight custody. Of those interviewed, all were Maori, nine were male, seven were under seventeen years of age and between them they had committed 850 burglaries but been apprehended for only 180 of those.

All the adults in this survey were unemployed and all the youths were enrolled in training courses. All stated that they used drugs except one. Seven of the burglars were associated with a gang and sold or swapped stolen property to a gang member or associate. Eight said their main reason for committing burglary was due to boredom or for the thrill.

Another risk factor mentioned by Police was the number of young offenders being sent back to Rotorua from other parts of the country by the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services (CYF), in the belief that being back with the whanau will improve their behaviour.

### **2.2.2 Perceived risk factors for burglary victimisation**

All of those interviewed in the Household Survey were asked whether they perceived any particular groups in the community as being more at risk of being victims. Although burglaries occurred across the Police Area and different socio-economic groups there were particular groups and locations perceived to be at greater risk. Respondents mentioned:

- holiday homes at nearby lakes, where the rural environment and the houses often being vacant made them more vulnerable for burglary
- isolated houses, either rural dwellings or urban houses with green belt access (e.g. next to parks or reserves), with the surroundings providing easy access

- having a lot of the Rotorua population condensed in residential areas around the city may exacerbate the risk of crime corridors, where offenders committed burglaries along their journey to or from the city
- houses not in Neighbourhood Support areas—more than 90% of Rotorua’s burglaries occurred in areas without Neighbourhood Support groups
- houses near offenders’ homes
- houses without adequate security.

### **2.2.3 Home security**

The survey found in 2002 that 65% (67% in 2004) of those interviewed in Rotorua believed it would be easy for a burglar to get into their home. Of those who thought it would be easy to get into their home, the most common reason mentioned for not doing more to protect their home from possible burglary was that they could not afford it (29% in 2002, 25% in 2004).

#### *Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

Burglary victims were less likely to have had security measures at the time of their most recent burglary, compared to all respondents at the time of the interview. For example, of the more common specialised security devices:

Security measure	All respondents 2002	Victims 2002
double locks or deadlocks	52%	31%
outside security lighting	54%	35%
burglar alarm	35%	15%
window safety latches	41%	24%
security chain on the door	33%	18%

Not all security measures were in use at the time of the burglary. For example, three of the nine burglar alarms (33%) victims had were not in use at the time of the burglary.

Victims of successful burglaries surveyed in Rotorua in 2004 had more security than the victims in the same area surveyed in 2002. Those victims in Rotorua with comprehensive security increased from 30% to 44% between 2002 and 2004.

### **2.2.4 Burglary victimisation**

The Household Survey on Burglary conducted in Rotorua in 2002 asked the 500 (507 in 2004) respondents if they had been burgled in the previous 20 months, and, if they had, asked for the details of their experience.

*Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

There was a significant increase in the incidence rate (average number of burglaries per household—including attempts) in Rotorua between 2001 (57) and 2003 (84), but this was largely due to one household in 2003 reporting 23 burglaries.

The prevalence rate measures the percentage of households that experienced one or more burglaries, including attempts. In 2001, 45 of the 500 households experienced one or more burglaries, giving Rotorua a prevalence rate of 9%. In 2003, 41 of the 507 households surveyed experienced one or more burglaries, giving a prevalence rate of 8.1%. In both years more households experienced a completed burglary than an attempted burglary. In Rotorua 1.6% of all households were burgled more than once in 2001, and 2.8% in 2003. Details were gathered for the most recent completed burglary. In 2001, 25% occurred while someone was at home, though there were no cases involving violence or a threat of violence. The percentage of people at home increased to 36% in 2003.

A substantial proportion of entries were made through unlocked doors or open windows. Burglary victims were less likely to have had security measures in place at the time of their most recent burglary, compared to those who had not been burgled. There was an increase in all areas in the number of shed and garage burglaries compared to the 2002 survey.

The burglary was reported to Police in 73% of the cases in 2001 and this increased to 81% in 2003. In most cases where the burglary was not reported the victims either felt the incident was too minor to report or else felt the Police could or would do nothing.

Regarding satisfaction with Police service, 22% of victims who notified the Police in 2001 were dissatisfied with how the Police handled the burglary, with service and outcomes being the main concerns. A further 44% of victims were satisfied with how the Police handled the burglary and 33% were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. In 2003 33% were dissatisfied with Police service, 31% were satisfied and 35% were neutral.



# 3 Police strategies

## 3.1 National strategies

One of the goals of the Government's Crime Reduction Strategy was to focus on burglary, which it identified as a high-volume crime that has a serious impact on victims and communities. In June 2000, the Justice and Police Ministers announced a new major burglary strategy. Over \$13 million in additional funding was awarded to the Police to be spent during 2000–2003 to reduce burglary, particularly repeat burglary. Government priorities were translated into Police objectives in the annual *New Zealand Police Departmental Forecast Report* and the *New Zealand Police Strategic Plan to 2006*. The *Strategic Plan to 2006* identified two strategic goals of community safety and crime reduction, and included a stated commitment to achieving national targets for violence, youth safety, organised crime, burglary and road safety.

The Police National Dwelling Burglary Reduction Strategy (BRS), developed during 2002, provided Police Districts and Areas with a framework to work within to reduce residential burglary rates. The strategy:

- encouraged Police to establish lead roles with communities to prevent burglaries
- advocated intelligence (Intel)-led policing to identify burglary problems and develop appropriate responses, with an increased emphasis on the use of informers and extended interviewing of burglary offenders
- stressed the need for Police to evaluate their burglary related strategies and share good practice.

The strategy also encouraged each Police Area's burglary strategy to focus on repeat offenders, victims and locations, and on disrupting stolen property distribution networks, with initiatives within each of these focuses directed towards:

- the prevention of burglary
- identification and resolution of burglary problems
- enforcement.

The strategy also outlined how Police intended to achieve a national target of reducing residential burglary for the 2002–2003 financial year by 3% and increasing resolutions to 18%.

The national priorities were communicated to the District Commanders within these documents and during the Police Executive Conference; however, District Commanders had considerable flexibility and discretion in developing local strategies. District Commanders were held accountable by means of an annual District appraisal based on specific performance measures. In the case of residential burglary, these measures were in the form

of population-based recorded residential burglary rates and resolution rates. Bay of Plenty District Police, however, reported that for residential burglary and other household crimes, rates would be more meaningful expressed as household-based rates.


### 3.1.1 Policing Development Unit

District Commanders have a great deal of autonomy in what strategies they employ and in how they allocate their resources to support these strategies. The national headquarters Policing Development Unit provides an internal consultancy role to support District and Area Commanders. They provide support and disseminate information through seminars, workshops, conferences and newsletters.

The Police have been promoting the problem-solving approach to reducing crime, which involves more analysis of the conditions which encourage crime and victimisation. For example, when a lot of crime is happening in one area, instead of just increasing the patrolling in that area Police are being asked to think about what factors in that area might be encouraging crime.

A review of Intel in the three Police Districts in Auckland in 2003–2004 by Australian criminologist J. Ratcliffe produced a series of recommendations involving the use of crime mapping, greater use of Intel and the adoption of the '3I' model, which shows the interrelationship between interpretation of the criminal environment, analysis, and then impacting on it through decision makers' deploying resources in the right way.

**Figure 3.1 3 'I' Model**



In order to successfully operate this model, Police have had to greatly increase their Intel capacity and change traditional policing methods. The key means of disseminating the new approach has been Intel training at the Police College. In over two years 460 analysts have attended basic and advanced courses.

Problem analysis involves building in the problem analysis components—people, products and processes—with the result that people are more professionalized. The tactical tasks involve:

- meeting once a week
- establishing priorities
- making decisions
- allocating clearly assigned tasks
- bringing in key partners.

The new approach has been taken up by enthusiastic District and Area Commanders. The adoption of the model has not been made a requirement, but Commanders are required to report back their crime reduction strategies and the evidence being provided by the problem-solving model has convinced many others to adopt it.

## **3.2 District strategies**

### **3.2.1 Bay of Plenty District Crime Reduction Strategy**

The Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) was developed in 2000 to formalise the crime reduction practices for all the Police Areas in the District in order to reduce crime and sustain crime reduction. The CRS identified key offence types for which specific strategies would be developed, due to their seriousness or prevalence. For the Rotorua Police Area, specific strategies were to be developed for family violence, theft from cars, and burglary. The CRS asserted that as a high proportion of crime was committed by a limited number of offenders and occurred with a limited number of victims and locations, a sizeable reduction in crime could occur with an increased focus on these 'hot' offenders, victims and locations, and 'hot' property or goods. The CRS also emphasised the need for increased resolution rates to assist with crime reduction, and suggested resolution rate targets be implemented for particular offence types.

The Bay of Plenty CRS introduced a 20% target reduction in all crime for each Police Area in the District for the 2002–2003 financial year (calculated as 20% less than the average of the past three financial years). To encourage a long-term crime reduction focus, the CRS also introduced a 50% target reduction over five years. Rotorua Police had not previously worked to crime reduction targets. The higher targets were seen as important both for reducing crime and for providing Police staff more focus and a sense of purpose to their work. It was hoped targets would enhance staff motivation, encourage good leadership and lead to a culture of teamwork and continuous improvement.

A key element emphasised in the District's CRS was the promotion of evidence-based and Intel-led policing in the development, application and evaluation of Police initiatives. An evidence-based approach aimed for a smarter policing response, continuing with initiatives identified as effective and discarding those found ineffective over time, enabling the development of a best-practices model. To develop an evidence-based and Intel-led policing approach, the District CRS first stage required the strengthening of Intel sections throughout

the District to enable the regular collection of high-quality, accurate data. The Intel capabilities for Rotorua Police were subsequently increased during 2002–2004.

The strategy identified the allocation of Police necessary to deliver crime reduction services, and established a framework to assign responsibilities, with accountability incorporated into the personal appraisal system. In addition to increased Intel capabilities, each Police Area in the Bay of Plenty District was to introduce:

- a Strategic Section to immediately respond to new information or focus on identified crime problems
- Field Officers to provide follow-up from Intel information and collect information for action on offenders
- Law Enforcement Teams (LET) for Police Areas, rather than district-wide
- Crime Recorders (introduced in mid-2002) to complete officers' paperwork in order to free them for other duties.

During 2002, the District Policing Development Manager and Rotorua Area Controller gave a presentation on the CRS and its rationale for focusing evidence-based policing efforts on 'hot' crime components to all the sections of the Rotorua Police. The Area Controller reported that feedback on the CRS from one-on-one staff consultation, the presentation, and consultation with the Police Association and community groups was positive. As one senior Rotorua Police respondent reported:

*...I think that we've turned a corner in our philosophy in relation to the attention that we're giving to burglary and crime. And I believe that within the next two to three years we'll see significant reductions in that crime if we continue along with that philosophy.*

The CRS also instructed that monthly variance reports examining the actual results versus the target be implemented and directed each Police Area to:

- break their quarterly targets down into weekly targets
- task staff appropriately
- assess performance on a weekly basis.

Implementing a weekly examination of the targets was to encourage a continual crime reduction focus. In the Rotorua Police Area this took place during weekly area focus meetings.

The District Policing Development Manager developed a BRS template. The template included a number of higher- and lower-level burglary reduction strategies, based around the key focus of targeting 'hot' offenders, victims, locations, and property. The desired outcomes were a reduction in recorded burglary rates and an increase in resolution rates. Each Police Area was then required to put the detail around the initiatives to form a BRS tailored to their particular burglary problems, and organise themselves structurally to deliver it.

### 3.3 Rotorua Area strategies

In line with the emphasis on evidence-based and Intel-led policing, the District Intel produced a burglary scan of the Rotorua Police Area in March 2002 to inform the development of Rotorua's BRS (see Section 3.3.1). The burglary scan provided detailed data on burglary patterns for the previous five years, clearance rates, identification of recidivist burglars, patterns of victimisation, and a comparison with other Police Areas which had been reporting success with burglary reduction.

Recommendations from this included:

- crime scene attendants (CSAs) attending all burglaries to produce a continuity in burglary offence report (OR) information and burglary scene forensic examination
- introduction of Field Officers and a Strategic Section with particular focus on burglary
- strengthening of data entry protocols
- increasing emphasis on burglary clearances
- improving voluntary fingerprint collection procedures
- increasing information sharing between Youth Aid and Intel
- conducting weekly reviews of current crime problems
- providing repeat burglary victims with security assistance
- trialling the school-based 'Burglary Free' education strategy
- implementing Operation SNAP (Serial Number Action Plan) for property.

#### 3.3.1 Rotorua Burglary Reduction Strategy

Rotorua's BRS was developed from the results of the burglary scan and the District BRS template, and was the first of its kind for Rotorua. The BRS included several initiatives that were already operating in the Rotorua Area. However, as these were all offender-focused, the BRS also identified victim-, location- and property-focused initiatives to encourage a more holistic approach to burglary reduction. While other Police Areas' best practice models were incorporated into the BRS, they were adapted to the local context.

The initiatives included in the BRS were:

- 'hot' offenders
  - risk assessment of offenders to determine those at high risk of reoffending
  - judicial order enforcement (e.g. bail checks, warrants to arrest, and parole conditions prioritised for high risk offenders)
  - improvement in resolutions to two per apprehended offender
  - reduction in youth offending
- 'hot' victims
  - reduction in repeat victimisation (negotiate with Council minimum building security standards for new building permits, make more target hardening available for repeat burglary victims)

- quality scene examination
- ‘hot’ locations
  - reduction in repeat location offences (e.g. identify environmental design improvements, provide crime prevention advice to residents)
  - directed patrolling.
- ‘hot’ property—interruption of stolen property markets (e.g. implement operation SNAP, develop informants for property offending, increased monitoring of secondhand dealers).

The BRS also detailed systems and community partnership improvements, including:

- systems and processes—case management to improve internal systems (e.g. all burglary files to be routed to one place, monthly file audits to review clearances); data entry improvements (e.g. reducing duplicate files, increasing information entered)
- partnerships—guidelines for successful Police and community engagement; a list of potential partners and examples of possible collaborative work (e.g. encourage iwi social service providers to provide programmes for high-risk Maori offenders).

The BRS was introduced formally into Rotorua in 2003, but some of the strategies were implemented during the previous year. The Field Officers and Strategic Section were formed in August 2002, and the LET was given responsibility for burglary reduction.

In addition, staff burglary reduction efforts were assessed in the weekly Area focus meetings, and good work was recognised and performance deficiencies discussed during the weekly crime meetings. The key measures for performance in relation to burglary reduction efforts were burglary incidence and resolution rates and volume of Police activities, such as the number of forensic samples and bail checks and the time spent on directed patrolling.

### **3.3.2 Rotorua Police structure**

In 2002 the introduction of the Bay of Plenty CRS and Rotorua BRS required a staff restructuring in order to provide the proposed proactive services and quick response to new information or emerging crime problems, while still providing reactive services. The Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB) and General Duties Branch (GDB) sections were reduced during the 2002 staff restructure to provide the additional CSA, Strategic Section, Crime Recorders, and Field Officers. The Strategic Section was instituted as a rotational unit which focused primarily on volume crime such as burglary. It consisted of a Sergeant and five constables who were removed from reactive duties in order to be able to focus on crime problems identified at the weekly tactical meetings.

Some sections within the staff structure were ring-fenced, meaning they were not to be called away from their core business to assist other Police sections and were required to maintain a set minimum number of staff at all times. The traffic section was ring-fenced due to their separate funding, and a minimum number of staff was required for the GDB frontline, watch house, and prison escort duties. This resulted in the community constables, CIB, Strategic Section, and Youth Aid staff, who were not ring-fenced, often being called away from their policing duties to relieve other positions. Senior Sergeants were also required to relieve one

another. There were often two or three away at one time, which placed a lot of pressure on the middle management tier.

Although Rotorua Police experienced some turnover in GDB staff, they reported their turnover was not as high as other Police Areas, and the senior positions tended to be relatively stable. During 2002 the Area Controller took a new position at District Headquarters, with the acting Area Controller managing two other portfolios while in the position. During 2003 Rotorua Police experienced a great deal of frustration with several senior positions being filled by temporary placements. The new Area Commander took up his position in July 2003. He soon created the position of Tactical Coordinator, whose role was to direct resources to problems identified at the tactical meetings.

The next year, 2004, was spent addressing internal structural and performance issues with the aim of having all staff working towards the same goal, with the Intel and logistical systems to support that.



# 4 Cross-focused initiatives

This section describes the range of burglary reduction initiatives undertaken by the Rotorua Police in the 2002–2004 period. The initiatives are grouped under those which focus on offenders, victims, locations and property. The first section, however, describes the initiatives which cross all those areas. This includes:

- tactical coordination
- Intel
- LET
- Field Officers
- Strategic Section.

## 4.1 Tactical coordination

The role of tactical coordinator was established in late 2003 in order to manage the human resources required to respond to crime and also undertake the proactive crime reduction strategies. In order to manage this, the tactical coordinator took a weekly, monthly, and quarterly overview of the staffing and planned for leave, training and other staff demands. The former roles of Shift Senior Sergeant only dealt with their own shift, but the tactical coordinator commanded all the station resources and had a more proactive perspective. Another aspect of the role was to ensure that people were undertaking the proactive tasks they were directed to do.

*It starts in getting people (somebody came up with a term for it last week, I think it was honey potting). The concept like some sort of juicy job going on that leads to the hive, and they are all buzzing around that and everyone rushes to that. Instead of somebody taking some control and discipline and saying no, we only need one to go to that job and you guys will carry on doing this proactive stuff, because their time can soon get gobbled up. You can have a couple of guys saying it is a safety issue where often it is not a safety issue at all they are just people wanting to get on a job. So you might have two cops standing there watching another two cops doing the job, and they don't really need to be there.*

### 4.1.1 Strengths of the tactical coordinator role

The following were identified as strengths of the tactical coordinator role.

- Staff members were able to be deployed according to strategic interventions, rather than business as usual within 'silos' of each unit and each shift.
- Staff could be directed to undertake more proactive work across the offender, location, victim and property areas.

- Staff would be supervised to ensure these measures were being undertaken and to monitor their effectiveness.
- The coordinator role was able to have an informed perspective covering Intel, Strategic Section and the LET and provided a flow of information.
- The role could ensure that proactive initiatives could be worked around training, leave and other demands.

#### **4.1.2 Weaknesses of tactical coordinator role**

The following were identified as weaknesses of the tactical coordinator role.

- The role did not carry the authority to direct GDB staff.
- The position assumed that there was proactive capacity within the station to address crime problems over and above normal duties.
- Some of the roles were unclear in relation to deploying and supervision of staff.

## **4.2 Intel section**

Intel plays a crucial role in the new crime and crash reduction approach to policing. The emphasis is now on how crime can be reduced and prevented, rather than the previous emphasis on catching offenders after the crime has occurred. This model is based on being well-informed and well-directed and using a whole-of-Police approach. In order to be able to interpret the crime environment and direct the resources to make the best impact, information needs to be timely, complete, relevant and accurate.

All of these areas have required a major increase in capacity and review of processes to ensure the flow of information, including:

- increasing quality of ORs completed by frontline staff
- increasing the efficiency of data entry
- increasing the skills of Intel staff in analysis
- reviewing meetings to increase effectiveness
- developing leadership so that crime managers think strategically about crime problems and make better requests of Intel.

At the same time Intel has had to manage the transfer of data from the Law Enforcement System (LES) to National Intelligence Application (NIA) and remove reliance on the prolific number of separate databases each section had developed for their own purposes.

Over the three-year period, as the District increased its analytical capacity it supported Rotorua Area through training, joint analytical projects and lending staff to cover shortages. There was a close working relationship between District and Area Intel.

A new Officer in Charge (OC) Intel was appointed in Rotorua May 2004, and he and another new analyst undertook the Intel training in Wellington over the next few months. During 2004 Area Intel underwent a great deal of internal capacity building and the ability to deliver timely accurate information subsequently improved greatly.

Many of the Police interviewed discussed a range of services Intel provided, which they believed assisted Rotorua's burglary reduction efforts.

#### **4.2.1 Services provided by Intel**

##### **4.2.1.1 Area focus meetings/tactical coordination meetings**

Intel provided the weekly meetings with the details and analysis of the current major crime problem, and was responsible for assessing whether each section fulfilled their agreed commitment to the weekly focus. This meeting was renamed Tactical Meeting in 2003. The quality of the information provided at these meetings was seen to have improved dramatically by the end of 2004.

##### **4.2.1.2 Weekly Police crime meetings**

For many years Rotorua has held weekly crime meetings to which all staff and outside partners were invited. The Intel Manager gave a PowerPoint presentation on the current 'hot' offenders and 'hot' locations, and the week's crime focus, which had been discussed the previous morning in the Area focus meeting. This information often involved burglary. Intel informed every section what their tasks were regarding the week's focus, and followed this up in writing after the meeting.

Staff attendance became compulsory following the introduction of the CRS in 2002. For those who could not attend the meeting (e.g. the afternoon and late shifts), Intel produced a booklet containing the information they presented at the meeting.

Neighbourhood Support and Victim Support have always attended the weekly meetings. However, after the introduction of the CRS, iwi representatives, Safer Community Council, Liquor Licensing, and Family Violence community representatives, and several staff from the Rotorua District Council, including the Dangerous Goods Inspector, Dog Ranger, and Building Inspectors, also attended the meetings.

##### **4.2.1.3 Daily staff briefings**

Intel also convened a daily briefing at 8.00am with CIB, LET and Strategic Section. As Intel systems improved, the briefings were able to include all crime figures for the previous 24 hours.

##### **4.2.1.4 Community patrol groups briefings**

Prior to the CRS, Intel communicated with the Community Watch, City Patrol, Western Knights, and Maori Wardens community patrol groups on an informal, ad hoc basis.

Following the expansion of the Intel section, Intel established weekly briefings with the community patrol groups every Wednesday afternoon.

#### **4.2.1.5 Weekly burglary data analysis**

Following the introduction of the burglary targets, Intel compared the number of recorded burglaries per week to:

- the target number of burglaries
- the number of recorded burglaries for the previous week
- the average weekly amount from the previous year.

Intel reported this weekly at the Area focus and Police crime meetings. Intel also reviewed the burglary data on a monthly cycle. In the latter part of the period the information on the number of bail checks was also depicted graphically in order to show the correlation between the number of checks and the number of burglaries.

#### **4.2.1.6 'Hot' offenders**

In line with the BRS, Intel prepared and held all the warrants to arrest, prioritising them so warrants for high-risk recidivist offenders were actioned first. Intel also established who should be targeted for bail checks, and had begun monitoring when offenders were released from prison. Intel also liaised with local media to publicise guilty verdicts obtained for burglary offenders.

#### **4.2.1.7 'Hot' victims and locations**

Neighbourhood Support and Victim Support had always been in daily contact with Intel. Intel reported all residential burglaries to Neighbourhood Support and Victim Support. During 2002 they began to identify repeat victims and report them to Victim Support. Police were aware of the Victim Support Target Hardening Programme. In response to the Household Survey, Intel worked with Victim Support and Neighbourhood Support in 2003 to survey the security of houses in Greenholm.

Intel used the MAPS programme to identify hot streets and burglary corridors for targeting by Police. The examination of burglary corridors was based on the theory that 85% of Rotorua's burglary offenders were opportunists and would offend within a corridor along their routine travel paths.

#### **4.2.1.8 Analysis**

Intel recorded information such as the number of burglaries, bail checks, resolutions, search warrants, and arrests to monitor the effectiveness of particular initiatives and the success of each six-week Strategic Section period. The results for each Strategic Section were displayed in the briefing room so subsequent Strategic Sections could see what was achieved, and to create an environment of competition.

### 4.2.2 Barriers to the Intel section

The section was understaffed due to training, ill health and maternity leave throughout much of the research period. Even when the staff complement was full, comment was made that the office would cease to function if one person was away. They felt that each position was so vital that with no one to cover when someone was away they were not able to work to their full capacity.

There were a number of data issues identified by respondents.

- Some of the same information was entered up to three or four times in different fields in different IT systems.
- There were no national standards concerning the quality of information that was recorded and then entered into the systems. This had an impact when an offender moved into the Rotorua Police Area. Rotorua Intel was unable to check an offender's modus operandi (MO), as other Police Areas had not entered the information they required into NIA.
- Earlier in the research period, Scene of Crime Officers had been attending all burglaries and the quality of ORs was high and consistent. However, due to the backlog that was occurring, the decision was made that the attendance go back to section staff. This resulted in a subsequent drop in quality of ORs. In 2003 an audit of burglary ORs resulted in a 90% failure rate, with them having to be returned to be corrected.
- Data entry backlogs existed due to staff shortages as well as the double or triple entry required in order to input to a range of databases.
- There were data entry errors.
- There was insufficient training in data extraction.
- There was insufficient strategic analysis.

### 4.2.3 Strengths of the Intel section

Many Police interviewed considered that the increase in Intel staff and the information and analysis they provided had greatly assisted the direction of their daily Police work, and agreed with the priority placed on their crime reduction strategies being Intel driven. Intel and Field Officers also considered that the burglary filing system had greatly improved burglary data collection and investigations. Respondents commented on:

- the quality and amount of notings increasing 'out of sight', and as this information was getting put into the system, a better quality of information was retrieved
- the national Intel trainer coming and spending a month with Intel section and writing a strategy paper with 30 points on how to improve the office processes
- Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) projects
- analysis of crime problems in a location by collation of a wide range of information as in, for example, the Atlas exercise described in Section 6.5.2
- training—two Intel officers topped their courses
- support from District Intel
- development of monitoring and evaluation procedures.

### **4.3 Law Enforcement Team**

In the 1999–2000 financial year the government provided additional funding to eight Police Districts to establish specialist proactive LETs. The primary focus of the Bay of Plenty LET was burglary, with secondary focuses of unlawful takings and violence. The LET was responsible for implementing and sustaining specific initiatives focused on their priority crimes, and focusing on highly recidivist offenders by utilising Intel and forensic information. To assist the sustainability of their initiatives, all LETs' personnel were ring-fenced so they could not be drawn away for other Police duties.

#### **4.3.1 Restructuring of district-wide Law Enforcement Team**

Initially, the LET consisted of twelve staff, including two non-sworn staff. During 2002 the LET underwent two restructurings. In April, the LET was split into two teams of five sworn staff, each responsible for half of the district. This restructuring was intended to increase the LETs' focus by narrowing their geographical areas. The two non-sworn staff were redirected to the District Headquarters to assist the District Operation Support division, who were to provide more specific and frequent areas of focus to the LETs.

In November 2002, the LETs were restructured to four teams of five detectives, each allocated to a Police Area. This required sourcing ten additional staff for the LETs from the different Police Areas, including releasing staff from the Rotorua CIB to the Whakatane and Taupo Police Areas. Detectives were to be rotated from the Rotorua CIB into the Rotorua LET for eight-month periods.

The crime focus areas for the Rotorua LET remained the same, although in December 2002, the LET was allocated ownership of burglary in Rotorua. Yet burglary was still emphasised as a priority for all Rotorua Police staff. At the weekly Area focus meetings the LET was held accountable for the weekly burglary figures, and required to report what they had done in regards to burglary.

The LET was put under the new Tactical Coordinator at the end of 2003, and a new manager of the team was appointed in late 2004. Two new detectives were rotated onto the team late in 2004, so the team then comprised a Detective Sergeant, two detectives and three constables.

LET staff morale in April 2002 appeared to be very high. However, in December 2002 it had noticeably decreased, seemingly from frustration resulting from the two restructurings during the year. Motivation was considered an important component to the LET's success, as the Area Controller reported:

*The reason our LET team works so well is because they are all good Police officers, they are all motivated.*

During 2003 and 2004, the team was reconfigured, with some new detectives being brought in, a new manager appointed and the field officers incorporated into the team. By the end of 2004 the LET was aligned with the focus on attacking burglaries through strategies across the

offender, location, victim and property quadrants, and was being well supported by Intel and through focused leadership.

### **4.3.2 Law Enforcement Team initiatives**

The LET operated a range of burglary offender-, property- and location-focused initiatives, often in conjunction with other sections in the Rotorua Police.

#### **4.3.2.1 Offender packages**

When a fingerprint or DNA sample was matched to a burglary scene, the Intel section used the MAPS programme and NIA data to identify other burglaries committed in the same area one month either side of the forensic-matched burglary. The burglaries with similar MOs to the forensic-matched burglary were placed into an offender package, along with a list of the suspect's recorded associates, and passed to the LET. The LET clerk then compiled a list of the stolen property from these burglaries and checked whether any of the local second-hand dealers had received any of that property, and if so, established if the forensic-matched suspect or an associate of theirs was the seller. LET detectives then interviewed the suspect and questioned them about the burglaries in the package, any stolen property information, and the involvement of any associates.

Utilisation of the offender packages enabled LET to:

- clear multiple offences
- charge the suspect with more than the one forensic-matched burglary
- identify further burglary offenders.

If the forensic-matched suspect was not in the National DNA Database, a LET detective encouraged them to provide a voluntary DNA sample. The information in the offender packages and from additional investigation by the LET also provided stronger grounds for a search warrant for the forensic-matched suspect's residence. Stolen property from the burglaries and evidence of other offending, such as drug possession or cultivation, were often identified during the searches.

#### **4.3.2.2 Targeting other offending**

The LET also targeted burglary offenders' other offending, such as non-payment of fines or driving offences. The LET, at times, identified suspected active burglary offenders in the fines enforcement list, visited them with a bailiff, and arrested them for non-payment. At times the LET also targeted suspected active burglary offenders driving non-registered vehicles or driving while disqualified, arresting them, disqualifying them from driving, or impounding their vehicle. The LET reported that many burglary offenders had outstanding fines, and used vehicles, often illegally, for their burglary offending. All the suspected active burglary offenders the LET arrested for other offences were interviewed in the same manner as those who were the subject of an offender package.

#### **4.3.2.3 Building the DNA database**

The LET also ran Operation VAMP, where they approached burglary suspects not in custody and requested voluntary DNA samples for the National DNA Database.

#### **4.3.2.4 Liaison with second-hand dealers**

During 2002 and 2003, the LET conducted monthly inspections of second-hand dealers. The role of regular liaison was performed by a clerk who was later transferred to the district office. That role had not been picked up by anyone else by the end of 2004.

#### **4.3.2.5 Parole Act**

In 2003, the LET Sergeant explored better utilisation of the Parole Act as a means of supporting offenders to stop reoffending upon their release. The initiative was to apply to the court to have special parole conditions applied to targeted offenders. This included non-association with known offenders, being prohibited from the CBD and alcohol bans. This has involved working closely with probation in relation to drafting their parole conditions.

### **4.3.3 Barriers to the Law Enforcement Team**

The quality of the LET's investigative work depended on the quality of the information they received. The LET reported in 2001 that there was less analytical quality to the information from Rotorua Intel in comparison with Tauranga Intel. However, they felt the quality of information they received from Intel had begun to improve during 2002. By 2004 they felt that there was an improved product from Intel but they still had to do too much analysis themselves.

The Rotorua LET reported that the transfer of the LET clerk to the District Headquarters in the first restructuring resulted in no burglary offender packages being developed for at least four months, and in a reduction in second-hand dealer visits. The team was glad to see the clerk redirected back to Rotorua Police in the second restructuring.

Another restriction identified late in 2003 was that the LET shifts were being worked from 7.00am until 3.00pm. This did not provide the flexibility required to develop initiatives in response to problems identified in the crime focus meetings. This inflexibility locked them into reliance on cell interviews alone—i.e. offender-focused.

### **4.3.4 Strengths of the Law Enforcement Team**

Senior Rotorua Police reported that a lot of the success of the LET was due to their personnel. The team was made up of experienced detectives and very motivated constables who were able to retrieve quality information from informants and cell interviews. The team had developed a good base of informants, and had great skills in interviewing suspects and getting people to provide voluntary DNA samples.

### **4.3.5 Law Enforcement Team: Future directions and suggested improvements**

Several senior Rotorua and District Police personnel reported that the Rotorua LET's initiatives were heavily offender-focused, and that their effectiveness in reducing burglary would benefit from additional initiatives focusing on stolen property, 'hot' locations and 'hot' victims.

## **4.4 Field Officers**

Detectives from the CIB filled the two Field Officer positions introduced in mid-July 2002. The Field Officers collected information to action in relation to burglars. One Field Officer estimated 85–90% of his work was focused on burglary and dishonesty offenders. The Field Officers' burglary-related work included:

- conducting interviews with suspects and offenders
- obtaining consents for voluntary DNA samples
- following up fingerprint or DNA matches
- investigating repeat MOs and suspects referred by Intel
- manning the 0800 Tip Off phone number
- cultivating informants
- monitoring second-hand dealers
- directing Strategic Section work.

Two initiatives in particular were associated with Field Officers: the 0800 Tip Off phone number was a number for the public to phone in any information regarding crime, made available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The phone calls went straight to a Field Officer's cell phone; the CIB Manager reported that although the number was for any crime, the majority of the information received related to drugs, serious crime and burglary. The 0800 Tip Off number had been operating since 1997, and prior to the introduction of the Field Officers, was manned by the CIB Manager. Since July 2002 the Field Officers have been promoting the 0800 Tip Off number in every media release.

During the changes implemented by the Area Commander in 2003 and the appointment of the Tactical Coordinator, the Field Officer positions in effect become part of the LET and answered to the OC Intel.

### **4.4.1 What do Field Officers achieve?**

The creation of the Field Officer positions and Strategic Section enabled information regarding burglary to be acted upon immediately, whereas previously this information could often be held for weeks until staff were available to act upon it. Numerous Police, including the Area Controller and District Commander, reported that success with the Field Officer roles was already apparent within two months of them being implemented.

- The Field Officers were able to conduct more cell interviews than had been possible under the previous structure, and obtained a good consent rate for DNA samples.
- Burglary offenders that Rotorua Police were previously unaware of were identified through burglary investigations conducted by the Field Officers.
- The Intel Manager reported that the Field Officers had prepared numerous search warrants and the LET Manager reported that the Field Officers produced stronger cases for search warrant applications based on the good Intel information they collected.
- Following the introduction of the Field Officers, an estimated two to three burglary suspects were arrested per week.
- The Intel Manager reported the Field Officers were cultivating some good public and criminally involved informants.
- Senior Police reported the Field Officers had achieved an increased number of burglary clearances.

#### **4.4.2 Barriers to Field Officers**

Two particular barriers to Field Officers operating effectively were discussed.

- Although there were two Field Officers, there were considerable time periods when only one Field Officer was on duty, due to secondments and leave requirements. There was no relieving detective when a Field Officer was away.
- Receiving 0800 Tip Off cell phone calls at all hours of the night could be disruptive for families.

#### **4.4.3 Strengths of Field Officers**

The CIB Manager reported that aside from the 0800 Tip Off number being manned 24 hours a day, seven days a week, a further strength was having detectives answer the calls, as detectives knew the right questions to ask in order to get the required information for any follow-up action, such as preparing a search warrant.

### **4.5 Strategic Section**

The Strategic Section was introduced in mid-July 2002 as part of the new CRS. Each of the five GDB sections was reduced to form a sixth section. The six sections each had a Sergeant and six Constables and rotated into the Strategic Section for five weeks. Each Strategic Section was also provided with a Detective rotated in from the CIB.

The Strategic Section was removed from reactive GDB policing duties to enable immediate action in response to information regarding focus crime problems. Their work frequently involved bail checks and executing search warrants and warrants for arrest. They also did other proactive activities, such as directed patrols in 'hot' locations. The Strategic Section shift began at 5.00am so they could conduct bail checks during the last two hours of bail curfews. Intel monitored each Strategic Section's performance, with their results displayed in the briefing room.

#### **4.5.1 Barriers to Strategic Section**

No staff interviewed disagreed with the establishment of a Strategic Section and what it was intended to achieve. However, opinions were expressed on how the Section was established, its rotational structure, and the barriers that restricted the Strategic Section's ability to provide timely proactive policing for the focus crimes. Senior Police also identified factors they believed contributed to the variation in performance between the different Strategic Sections.

Staff often had follow-up work to complete from their time in GDB when they entered their Strategic Section rotation, such as completing paperwork and making court appearances.

The five-week period in the Strategic Section appeared to be increasingly used for leave and training day requirements. Senior Police reported that there had been difficulties with ensuring staff training and leave requirements were not rostered to coincide with a staff member's time on the Strategic Section, yet some felt this would improve over time as staff became more familiar with the rotation system.

Strategic Section staff was called upon to relieve for watch house, community constables and Murupara Station Police who were on leave or training days. Senior Police reported difficulties ensuring the scheduling of other Police staff training and leave requirements did not result in reduced frontline staff to the point where Strategic Section staff had to assist. Again, some Senior Police felt this would improve over time as staff became more familiar with the rotation system. Strategic Section staff were also called upon to assist with serious crime investigations.

The reduction in Strategic Section staff numbers and time available for Strategic Section work limited the extent to which the section could achieve its purpose of providing immediate action in response to focus crime problems. One example given was where the second Strategic Section rotation came on with three staff, and consequently the execution of some search warrants was delayed until enough staff were available. Senior Police were concerned that Strategic Section work would not be sustainable if the Strategic Section continued to be called away from their duties. This complaint was still being made at the end of 2004.

Senior Police reported that there was a large variation in experience among the six supervising sergeants, and believed the experience and leadership qualities of the Sergeant selected for the first Strategic Section strongly contributed to the results the first Strategic Section achieved. All the staff for the first Strategic Section were chosen with the Strategic Section in mind, with all considered to be highly motivated to do the Strategic Section work and with appropriate experience or interest in the work.

Many Police noted variability between the different Strategic Sections' performance. For example, the first Strategic Section resulted in a high burglary resolution rate and many bail checks done, yet the second rotation did not do as well, and although the third and fourth rotations outperformed the second, they did not reach the level of the first rotation.

#### **4.5.2 Strengths of Strategic Section**

The creation of the Strategic Section enabled information regarding burglary to be acted upon immediately, whereas previously this information could often be held for weeks until staff were available to act upon it.

In December 2002 the CIB Manager reported that the Field Officers and the Strategic Section were working well together and had done some excellent work. Senior Police reported that there was a noticeable increase in bail checks following the introduction of the Strategic Section, and that the Strategic Section had executed numerous search warrants and warrants for arrest. An estimated two to three burglary suspects were arrested per week. The turnaround for the preparation and execution of warrants had also reduced.

A Strategic Section roster provided GBD staff with an opportunity to focus on bail checks and burglary. The Strategic Section was provided with a car for bail checks and the number being completed went up significantly during 2003 and 2004.

The leadership and direction was improved when it came under the control of the new Tactical Coordinator in 2003. Working closely with Intel and the LET enhanced the flow of information.

The period on Strategic Section increased the understanding of the purpose of proactive work and gave a wider picture than the one on GDB, which was mainly reacting to emergencies.

#### **4.5.3 Future directions and suggested improvements**

Several senior Police disagreed with the Strategic Section being on a rotational system. The rotational system was chosen to:

- provide GDB staff an opportunity for a change from their usual frontline duties
- improve their skills
- introduce them to proactive policing.

There was also concern that a permanent Strategic Section might experience declining motivation or burnout. However, it was also argued that a permanent Strategic Section would have more motivation than rotating sections as they would have ownership of strategic work, which is difficult to foster for five-week intervals.

*I think ideally it would be better to have a more established group and not rotate them through it—have a core of probably four staff, taking two staff off section, then after five weeks another two—so that it works more permanent for them. I think ideally three months would be better for them. Because you find that with a particular strategic group, you might just be going hell for leather for a burglary ring and do awesome work into that ring and then it is dropped or the next section might not want to pick it up because that was what they were doing and we don't want to do that—we want something else to do, or for whatever reason.*

One suggestion was that staff remain on the Strategic Section for a longer period of time, with only one or two staff rotated at a time. Another suggestion was that the Strategic Section be a permanent section of selected staff who exhibit the necessary skills and express an interest in the role. Wanganui Police have a permanent Strategic Section, and several years ago Rotorua had a very similar permanent section called the Crime Control Unit that was reportedly very effective, and was only disestablished due to staff shortages. A further suggestion was to retain a team rotation, possibly with a longer rotation time, but with a permanent Sergeant for the Strategic Section.



# 5 Offender-focused initiatives

## 5.1 Targeting offenders

Targeting high-risk recidivist offenders has been a key element of the Rotorua BRS. This involved:

- performing a risk assessment of offenders to determine those at high risk of reoffending
- enforcing judicial orders (e.g. bail checks, warrants to arrest, and parole conditions prioritised for high-risk offenders)
- improving resolutions to two per apprehended offender
- reducing youth offending.

### 5.1.1 Rationale for targeting offenders

Intel analysed information to brief staff at the weekly crime meetings. They presented a PowerPoint summary of people who had warrants issued for their arrest, prioritising those who were identified as high-risk recidivists. This list also included people identified for bail checks and those wanted for questioning in relation to recent offences. The information was provided in a paper form for those not attending the meetings and for the patrol cars.

All frontline staff was encouraged to target people named in that week's list. They were required to provide notings of all interactions. LET and Strategic Section enforced warrants and followed up bail breaches. From time to time extra efforts were made to 'go hard out' on the worst offenders.

In 2003 an exercise was carried out by LET, CIB and the new Strategic Section to focus on the worst 50 offenders. Most of those were arrested for a range of crimes, including armed robberies, not just burglary.

### 5.1.2 Fifty-two Pick up

In May 2004 Rotorua introduced Fifty-two Pick up. The aim was to make an impact on the top offenders in the Area. The initiative was carried out for three months. Two staff members were provided with the name of one targeted offender, with 52 offenders being targeted. The targets were given to patrol staff, CIB, Strategic Traffic Unit, GDB and Youth Aid. Police were told to 'cold call' just to let the offender know they were being watched. They would check car registration and warrants of fitness, stop cars in transit and ask to look inside—basically to keep them in sight. The Area Commander said:

*The aim was that every person who got a card would go out and spend a little of their time each day trying to hunt their person down. Making them think more about what they were going to do, watching them all the time. So every time they put a foot wrong, we would be there to jump on them.*

### **5.1.3 Strengths of Fifty-two Pick up**

The following strengths of Fifty-two Pick up were noted.

- It provided the staff with focus and gave them an opportunity to increase their knowledge of offenders and their associates, movements and habits.
- The Intel resource had improved greatly over the three years of the case study and provided a good focus for the staff.
- When well directed and supervised, it encouraged staff to go out and actively search for the offender, ask around and collect information.
- When notings were taken it increased the Intel on that person, which helped to create a fuller picture.
- Staff were generally pleased with the increased focus the initiative gave them; some felt it gave them something to 'get their teeth into'.

### **5.1.4 Barriers to Fifty-two Pick up**

The following barriers were mentioned.

- The initiative did not produce the level of Intel through notings that was thought possible.
- There were thought to be too many offenders on the list and Police thought that there should be a list of about ten 'hot' offenders and three or four staff would be looking for each.
- Sometimes an officer arrested someone else's card—lack of communication and confusion over who was responsible for what.
- The Area Commander thought that they needed to have lists of more offenders ready to take the place of those arrested.
- Monitoring procedures were not put in place initially so it was difficult to measure results or whether people allocated the cards were putting any time into it. The staff also wanted feedback on what happened to their card.
- One of the problems identified in Rotorua was that the Area had such a high number of 'worst ones' and that there were always so many more to go on the list.
- The uptake from Police varied, depending on how well the Sergeants were committed and how well they understood the purpose and the expectations.
- Some commented that there was not enough of a proactive resource in Rotorua to be able to take the time required to have the initiative be successful.

### **5.1.5 Overall effectiveness of targeting offenders**

Targeting offenders was generally accepted by Rotorua Police to be an effective strategy. The best practice was thought to be to select fewer targets (generally five) each week and direct all staff to focus on them. Specific initiatives helped from time to time to focus the Police on key targets, and these worked best when a whole-of-Police approach was taken. This involved traffic, GDB, Youth Aid, CIB and LET working together for a common goal. Sometimes special operations were mounted to catch a particular recidivist offender utilising undercover Police, bike patrols, etc.

### **5.1.6 Strengths of targeting offenders**

Targeting offenders provides a focus for patrols and other Police units. It provides an opportunity to gather more Intel on those offenders, remove key offenders and subsequently reduce crime. It provides an opportunity for the whole-of-Police approach: utilising traffic, GBD, Strategic Section, Youth Aid, and also other community partners. Rotorua Police have a good knowledge of the criminal community and a targeted offender initiative is a chance to have an impact on this.

*A lot of that comes out of our weekly Crime and Crash Focus meetings. Like there were about five burglars identified yesterday that will get hammered next week. Like that 15-year-old—he has been targeted for about a month. He has been arrested and bailed, arrested and bailed, arrested and bailed, and now that he has been locked up, his neighbourhood which was also his suburb and a ‘hot’ spot, has now gone cold since he has been taken out of circulation.*

### **5.1.7 Barriers to targeting offenders**

Some comments were made that Rotorua has so many offenders that there are always more to take the place of those removed into custody. Another comment was that many people offending are not on the Police offender lists and so may stay ‘off the radar’.

There were also comments that Rotorua is already too ‘offender-focused’ and that more work is needed to strengthen the other areas of crime reduction. The targeting of organised gangs and drug offenders was thought by some to be an area currently overlooked.

## **5.2 Bail checks**

Rotorua has been conducting bail checks since the late 1990’s. However, the frequency of bail checks increased with Rotorua’s introduction of the CRS and BRS. The routine enforcement of bail conditions therefore became an increasingly high-priority initiative of the burglary reduction effort in Rotorua.

The types of bail conditions commonly placed on those charged with burglary were:

- nighttime curfew for defendants charged with a nighttime offence, with the requirement to present themselves at the door of a specific address when Police checked
- non-association orders with co-accused

- ban on alcohol or drug consumption where this was considered a factor in the offending.

Intel operated an Excel spreadsheet containing all those under bail conditions. Intel used bail conditions information faxed from the Court and from the Excel spreadsheet to update the curfew sheets on a daily basis. The curfew sheets included the defendant's photo, name, address, and bail conditions, and the date of their next court appearance.

The bail conditions were primarily enforced through curfew checks. Following consultation with the Executive Judge, the Bay of Plenty District Police recommended Rotorua grade bail checks to focus on those at high risk of reoffending. Intel maintained a bail checks folder containing the top twenty recidivist high-risk recidivist offenders for each section that conducted bail checks. With each of these folders containing the same people, it was likely that a defendant was checked more than once a night, by different sections. Those at paramount risk were checked four or five times, though generally a top twenty offender was checked twice a night.

The GDB, Strategic Traffic Unit, CIB, LET, community constables, and Dog sections were also provided bail check folders and conducted bail checks when possible.

Following a bail check, the officer completed a bail check form, recording the time, date and result of the bail check. Intel checked all bail check forms the following morning. If a breach of bail had occurred, Intel confirmed with the Court that the bail conditions had not changed without Police being informed, again to avoid a wrongful arrest. Intel then created a file for the defendant's arrest, which was generally actioned by the Strategic Section. Intel also monitored how many bail checks were done each night.

Until mid-2002 Rotorua focused on 30 to 40 defendants on bail conditions, with a top ten checked once each night by the GDB and the rest distributed to other Police sections to check when they could. The change to only the top 20 defendants considered most at risk for reoffending was based on the theory that 80% of crime was committed by 20% of offenders. The change to all sections receiving the same list of defendants for bail checks was based on Rotorua's past experience that just one check or checks done at set times essentially provided defendants set hours they knew were safe to leave their residence.

Bail checks were completed less frequently prior to 2002, because of the reactive Police requirements of the GDB and the lower priority that was placed on bail checks. The introduction of the Strategic Section, the decrease in file work for other sections with the introduction of the Crime Recorders, and further education of Police staff regarding the benefits of bail checks were intended to increase the frequency of bail checks.

In the first half of 2002 the GDB sections were predominantly responsible for conducting bail checks; this transferred to the new Strategic Section in July 2002. Each GDB section's performance with bail checks during their five weeks as the Strategic Section was assessed.

In 2003 the Strategic Section had bail checks as a number one priority, and had a crime car at their disposal so they wouldn't be waiting for general cars to be available. This greatly increased the number of bail checks being conducted. During the year the Strategic Section was depleted in order to backfill staff on training and leave. The decision was made later in

the year to require all GDB staff to conduct bail checks and a target of 200 per week was instituted. By the end of 2004, bail checks were a regular part of the shift duties and the sections were regularly achieving 200 or more per week.

### **5.2.1 Rationale for bail enforcement**

Offending can escalate between the time offenders are charged and the time they make their court appearances, where the offender may commit many more burglaries under the belief that further burglaries committed on bail will have a minimal effect on their sentence.

*...they go on a bloody spree because they know if you are going to go away into an institution or prison somewhere, they may as well get what they can and they go crazy.*

The principle underlying bail checks is to counter recidivism by preventing offenders from reoffending while on bail. Bail checks, when carried out randomly and more than once a night, essentially act as a de facto house arrest, particularly in relation to curfews and non-association orders.

Bail checks were considered by many of the Police to be one of their most successful offender-focused initiatives. Intel's monitoring of the number of completed bail checks enabled comparisons of bail check activity with burglary rates. Numerous Police reported that consistently, when bail checks increased, reported burglaries decreased. The Rotorua burglary scan identified that the lowest monthly burglary figures for the preceding five years occurred in July 2001, which coincided with a heavy bail check phase. However, the scan also identified that the majority of the residential burglaries occurred during the day, yet few defendants were under daytime curfews. Night curfew checks might also deter daytime offending, with defendants aware that Police were observing their activities. Police commented that bail checks enabled them to become aware of other offending—such as through seeing stolen property at defendants' residences, or seeing evidence of drug offending—and also applied pressure to defendants' associates.

When bail checks identified defendants breaching their bail conditions, they were quickly identified as suspects for offences that occurred during the time of their breach. A breach of bail also lessened a defendant's chance of being released on bail in the future.

Numerous respondents from the community and the justice sector, including defence lawyers, were aware of the bail checks, and believed they were successful in deterring burglaries. Some, though, expressed concern that repeat night curfew checks were disruptive for others residing with defendants.

### **5.2.2 Barriers to bail enforcement**

The following barriers were identified in the interviews with Police staff.

- Prior to July 2002, maintaining a high level of bail checks was not achieved. Other work, such as attending urgent incidents, assisting serious crime investigations, traffic hours, and completing file work, often had to take priority over bail checks. Senior Police anticipated that the introduction of the Strategic Section and Crime Recorders would sustain a high

number of bail checks. Several Police staff members were still doubtful that high levels of bail checks could be sustained. Staff noted that the second Strategic Section rotation was called away to assist with serious crime investigations, and the five-week period in the Strategic Section appeared to be increasingly used for leave and training day requirements.

- Some Police respondents believed that offenders were unlikely to change their behaviour as a result of bail checks. Whilst being heavily targeted they might be more careful, but as soon as the pressure came off they would go as 'hard out' as before.
- Early in 2002, Prosecutions and Senior Police identified that more staff training and supervision were required for setting effective bail conditions, particularly for new staff.
- There was noticeable variability between different Strategic Sections' performances in bail checks. This was attributed to differences in Strategic Section leadership, and the second rotation being pulled away from Strategic Section duties to assist with serious crime investigations.
- Many Police staff members were not informing Intel when they had imposed Police bail conditions. Consequently, these defendants were not placed in the Excel database for bail checks.
- Senior Police reported there was some staff resistance to performing bail checks. Reasons for resistance to bail checks were:
  - prioritising the demands of other work
  - a lack of understanding about the potential of bail checks
  - demoralisation when defendants who breached bail were re-bailed on the same conditions.

By 2004, as bail checks became more thoroughly implemented and staff became more accountable for reaching bail targets, the resistance became more isolated to a few Sergeants, and these issues were managed through performance processes.

- There were a few occasions where a defendant's bail conditions were changed yet the Court had not informed Police, with the defendant wrongfully arrested for breach of bail. On one occasion Rotorua Police were then required to pay compensation. Although Police now double-check the bail conditions of defendants with the Court before arresting the defendant for breach of bail, long delays with the Court phone systems and the Court attempting to find the appropriate staff member frequently occurred. Police, however, have discussed these issues with Court staff, and reported that communication with the Court was improving.
- Sometimes the conditions placed on juvenile offenders, such as non-association, are regarded by the courts as being too hard. The offender will complain to the court and have the conditions changed. Youth Aid believe that each set of conditions needs to be carefully designed for the individual it applies to—otherwise it demoralises a young person who may be trying to improve.
- Many burglars have had the night curfew imposed on them but they are out during the day and offending. Police would prefer the court to consider 24-hour curfews more often. Some people believed that daytime burglaries had increased.
- There was a fear that some Police officers are at risk conducting bail checks alone; as one officer said, 'some of the offenders are bigger and uglier than we are'.
- When part of the bail conditions requires a person to attend a training course, the success is dependent on the course coordinator reporting a failure to attend. Some training

courses in Rotorua are very haphazard about attendance and therefore the condition is meaningless.

- Bail checking and the targeting of offenders is based on the assumption that Police are aware of the names and habits of most offenders. However, according to one respondent, 186 burglars caught last year were new to the Police.

### **5.2.3 Strengths of bail enforcement**


Since bail checks have been instituted in a rigorous way in Rotorua the burglary rate has trended downwards: from an average of over forty per week in 2003 to mid-twenties in 2004. In December 2004 the Area Commander said:

*We have quite consistently been doing over 200 bail checks a week or more; I mean we could have done 400. The staff has pretty well accepted now that bail checks are important. It is just a case of keeping the focus on them. There is another chart, which shows a very strong correlation that when bail checks are up, burglaries are down and when bail checks are down, burglaries are up. It is very clear and that is the experience around the country as well.*

- The majority of Police interviewed considered the introduction of the Strategic Section and Crime Recorders would assist with sustaining a high level of bail checks, so long as bail checks remained a priority core function of the Strategic Section. Several Police also commented on the good work the dog section was doing with bail checks.
- Rotorua Police had put a lot of effort into discussing the benefits of the different kinds of bail conditions, and their bail checks initiative with the local Judges. This communication was maintained with Police Prosecutions' monthly meetings with the judges. Police reported that the local judges were very supportive of strict night curfew conditions, non-association orders, and bans on alcohol and/or drug consumption.
- Police found that bail checks allowed them to get to know their criminals, their habits and associates and crime behaviour.
- The strategy was said to work best when there was a good transfer of information at the handover of shifts, otherwise the breach is not followed up immediately and the momentum is lost. Some section staff mentioned it was best to follow up immediately and try to find and arrest the person who has breached. In some cases they have found them committing a burglary.
- Bail checks provided a focus and direction to the patrol staff. They encouraged staff to stop and question suspected offenders wherever they were seen.

The following diagram was part of a presentation given by the Area Commander to the Rotorua District Council in 2004. It indicates the correlation between the number of bail checks and the number of burglaries carried out in March and April 2004. Figures for the full year were not available at the time of writing. This chart was used by the Area Commander to convince staff of the effectiveness of the strategy.

**Figure 5.1: Diagram to show the correlation between bail checks and burglaries**



Note: Left axis denotes the number of bail checks, right axis denotes the number of burglaries and breaches.

### 5.2.4 Future directions and suggested improvements

There have been some recent High Court decisions that those under seventeen years of age could not be arrested for breach of bail conditions. Rotorua Police feared that bail conditions would then have no effect on reducing reoffending by recidivist youth offenders while on bail. There was also concern about the impact this might have on Police motivation to check youth bail conditions, as their only possible action following a breach of bail would be to report the breach and any subsequent offending while on bail to the judge.

## 5.3 Custody clearances

A method Rotorua used to resolve more burglaries was the practice of custody clearances, where Police detectives sought confessions to other burglary offences from an offender while they were in Police custody or prison. From mid-July 2002, prior to executing a warrant for arrest, Field Officers prepared a file containing burglaries with similar MOs to the offence subject to the arrest warrant, and a list of the suspect's known associates. This was done for every burglary suspect about to be arrested. Prior to the introduction of the Field Officers, the LET prepared similar burglary packages when time allowed (see Section 4.3, Law Enforcement Team). The introduction of the new burglary filing system provided the Field Officers quick access to all the reported burglaries for the previous two months, so they were able to quickly produce a similar file for burglary suspects apprehended by immediate arrest.

Prior to the restructuring, detectives from the LET or CIB conducted the custody interviews. Suspects were asked:

- if they were guilty of the other burglaries Police suspected them for
- if there were additional burglaries or other offences they would like to confess
- what days and times of day they commit burglaries and why

- what methods they use to avoid detection
- what type of property they target
- what they did with the stolen property
- whether there were any co-offenders
- why they chose those households to burgle over others
- why they offended.

Sometimes the Field Officer also drove the suspect around Rotorua to identify the households they had burgled. To encourage a suspect to discuss their burglary offending, the detective might offer immunity from prosecution for some of the offences they confessed to, whereas if Police identified them for those offences at a later date they were likely to face another prosecution.

### **5.3.1 Rationale for custody clearances**

Senior Rotorua and District Police believed custody clearances had several benefits.

- Investigative efforts—Resolving other burglaries allowed more investigative efforts to be focused on remaining burglaries. The District Commander reported one particular case where Police cleared a large number of offences by one highly recidivist offender.
- If an offender were to re-offend the MO might be matched to the MO of their previous offending. Custody clearances could also alert the Police to unreported burglaries.

A local defence lawyer believed custody clearances were effective, particularly those with youth offenders. If Police were to later identify them for those offences after their seventeenth birthday they would then be subject to the adult justice system.

*...I think the clean slate process is fabulous. You are doing something really rehabilitative and restorative for the kid anyway [FGCs], why not wrap it up altogether. Quite often there is no consequence for them anyway with the clean slate other than a future [family group] conference.*

Police reported that in early 2002 monthly recorded resolution rates experienced a decrease, and while they picked up in the second quarter, they had not increased in the third quarter following the introduction of the Field Officers. However, several Police did not rely on the recorded resolution rates as an accurate reflection of the resolutions obtained, for the following reasons:

- suspected duplication of burglaries in LES resulted in an inflated rate of recorded burglaries, and thus an artificially diminished recorded resolution rate
- a noticeable increase in resolutions had occurred, but not all resolutions were being recorded on charge sheets or entered into LES.

The District Commander strongly advocated increasing resolutions through custody clearances, and in late 2002 directed District and Rotorua Police to identify and resolve any data entry issues affecting the recorded resolution rates.

### **5.3.2 Barriers to custody clearances**

The burglary scan identified that many burglary clearances held in Youth Aid received files were not entered into LES. As 25% of the burglary offenders dealt with in 2001 were youth, this was likely to have contributed to a diminished resolution rate. This problem may not have been fully rectified during 2002.

GDB made the majority of Rotorua's immediate arrests. Anyone arrested for burglary was meant to be interviewed by a Field Officer or other detective while in custody. However, during 2002 there were some occasions when suspects were bailed before an interview was conducted.

The Murupara station was not able to prepare burglary files in preparation for custody interviews as the Rotorua station did not provide them with a lot of burglary offence information. This problem was not unique to burglaries.

*...a car was stolen out here. A week later when I was down at the shops somebody said to me 'did you hear about that car being taken last week?' I came back to the station and nobody here knew about it—so of course we weren't looking for it.*

### **5.3.3 Strengths of custody clearances**

Senior Police reported that the personnel conducting custody interviews had a big impact on the success of custody clearances, as it was essential for them to be able to establish a rapport with a variety of different offenders and have excellent interviewing skills. These attributes were important considerations in the selection of the Field Officers. Police considered that the Field Officers conducting the majority of custody clearances would ensure a consistently high standard of custody interviews.

Previously in Rotorua one of the biggest demotivators for Police obtaining custody clearances was the amount of paperwork they were then required to do for each admitted offence. The Crime Recorders introduced in mid-2002 now complete this paperwork.

Rotorua Police considered that the preparation of the interview files prior to the custody interviews strengthened the likelihood of obtaining confessions during custody interviews. Senior Police also believed that the range of issues beyond confessions discussed in the interviews would contribute to a greater understanding of burglary in the Rotorua Area.

### **5.3.4 Future directions and suggested improvements**

The District Commander intended to introduce a resolution management strategy to Rotorua Police staff in 2003. This strategy was to be developed by the District CIB Manager and was to identify:

- reasons resolutions are important for more than statistical purposes, such as providing information for Police Intel and victims
- the best methods to identify and interview offenders who may discuss their offending

- guidelines for when and when not to prosecute custody cleared offences—the District Commander’s current thoughts were that if the offender was clearly going to prison they should be offered a clean slate for any other offences they could clear.

In December 2002 District Police were reviewing the resolution rates for all the Police Areas in the District, with the intention to set district-wide resolution targets for the next five years and identify what would be acceptable variances between Police Areas. If a Police Area’s resolution rate fell outside that band this would identify that their resolution practices require addressing. The acting Area Controller, however, reported that when the District reviewed Rotorua’s resolution data it did not take into account the resolutions that had not been entered into LES. Rotorua Intel recommended that before a burglary file is permanently filed, a check should be made to see whether anybody resolved that burglary, but did not record it. According to the Police crime statistics the resolution rate (or clearance rate) for burglary increased substantially from 2000 to 2004 (60.5%), compared with the increase in the national clearance rate for the same period (9.5%).

## **5.4 Collection of voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints**

Matching DNA samples and fingerprints to scene evidence was an important means of linking suspects to offences or eliminating suspects from enquiries. The national databank held the National DNA Database of individual DNA samples and the Crime Sample Database of DNA samples taken from crime scenes. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database contained individuals’ fingerprints and prints lifted from crime scenes. Together, the national databank and the AFIS database were used to identify matches between suspects and offences.

Although all compulsory DNA samples and fingerprints are held in the Databank or AFIS database, they also hold many unidentified crime scene DNA profiles and prints. For this reason, the Rotorua Police set a target of obtaining thirteen voluntary DNA samples per month, and actively encouraged the gathering of voluntary fingerprints from youth who came to their attention.

In 2003 new legislation was introduced which had an impact on the collection of DNA. The DNA Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Amendment Act 2003 amended the Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act 1995 (the principal Act). The 2003 Amendment Act received the Royal assent on 30 October 2003 and commenced on 15 April 2004.

The amendment sought to strike a balance between extending the use of DNA as a valuable crime-fighting tool, and the recognition and protection of fundamental personal rights. The aim was to extend the potential pool of DNA profiles to significantly increase the chances of apprehending the perpetrators of serious offences.

### **5.4.1 Collecting voluntary DNA samples**

Voluntary DNA samples could be obtained from those fourteen years of age and older, with parental consent required for those fourteen to sixteen years of age. Once the offender or suspect agreed, the Detective arranged for a registered nurse to take the blood sample. The

DNA samples were then sent to the Hamilton Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR), where the individual's DNA was profiled and entered into the National DNA Database.

Rotorua Police obtained well over 100 voluntary DNA samples in the first quarter of 2002. Rotorua's high level of obtaining DNA samples continued during the year, yet by September, three months into the 2002–2003 financial year, Rotorua had spent more than a quarter of the DNA funding available for that financial year. As a consequence, the monthly DNA samples target was reduced. The samples taken by Rotorua Police in the research period were:

- 2002: 249
- 2003: 65
- 2004: 204

There were several changes during the period in relation to the collection of prints and DNA at crime scenes. After the BRS was released, the CSA staff attended every burglary—one collected forensic evidence and one took the offence report. Although this increased the quality of the evidence in the start, by mid-2003, the delay in the CSA team getting to the sites was increasing, and the quality dropped off. Late in 2003, the strategy was changed once more so that GDB attended the burglaries in the first instance and CSAs went when called by them.

Compulsory fingerprints were obtained when a person was charged with an offence. However, most youth who came to the attention of Police were not charged with an offence, particularly juveniles (13 years of age and under). Rotorua Police considered it very important to obtain voluntary prints from young people, believing that a large majority of the prints the CSAs obtained from residential burglaries were likely to be those of youth offenders. Parental consent was required for juveniles' voluntary fingerprints.

The officer in charge of a case involving a young person under the age of seventeen years was responsible for obtaining voluntary fingerprints. The importance of obtaining voluntary fingerprints was often emphasised at the weekly crime meetings.

It was explained to young people that having their fingerprint in the database could eliminate them as a suspect. To parents Police emphasised the deterrent effect on further offending when young people knew the Police had their fingerprints.

#### **5.4.2 Rationale for the collection of voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints**

The matching of DNA samples and fingerprints to crime scene evidence was an important component to clearing burglary offences, as burglars were rarely caught during a burglary. Gathering voluntary fingerprints from juveniles had resulted in a number of matches with burglary scene evidence. Apprehending young people early might interrupt a path to more serious offending later.

Intel reported that the DNA database of offenders and suspects started to become valuable to Rotorua Police in 2002 as it had begun providing some matches with crime scenes. Although the volume of matches in 2002 was not high, Rotorua Police believed the database

will be a valuable tool to assist with future resolutions of a range of offence types, particularly serious violence and sex offences. Frequently, those apprehended for these types of offences had burglary convictions in their histories. DNA matching was also very useful for eliminating suspects for these types of offences, and would save a great deal of time in checking suspects rather than using conventional methods. Most Police also believed that the collection of both DNA samples and fingerprints acted as a deterrent for some offenders.

When a match was made, Police were then able to examine the MO of the matched offence, and possibly identify other offences with the same or similar MOs the offender was associated with, where no DNA or fingerprints were found at the scene.

#### **5.4.3 Barriers to the collection of voluntary DNA samples and fingerprints**

Police identified the following barriers to the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints.

- Rotorua Police were very motivated to obtain voluntary DNA samples, but were frustrated by the funding restrictions requiring them to cut back on the number of DNA samples obtained.
- Rotorua Police also found it very frustrating and demotivating when a match was made between a voluntary DNA sample and a burglary scene, but the Criminal Investigations Blood Samples Act (1985) prevented them from obtaining a compulsion order for a confirmation sample. If the apprehended person chose not to supply another DNA sample, the charge had to be dropped.
- There was some concern that the number of burglary scenes with DNA or fingerprints present had decreased over time. Once offenders heard of prosecutions involving DNA and fingerprint evidence, they became more sophisticated with their MOs, taking precautions to avoid leaving evidence at the scene.
- Rotorua Police also commented that hardened recidivist offenders wouldn't agree to provide a voluntary DNA sample.
- The burglary scan identified that a large proportion of the voluntary juvenile fingerprints collected during 2001 were on the wrong form, preventing them from being processed and entered into the database. With a number of Police staff obtaining the voluntary fingerprints, variability in the quality of the prints was observed by senior Police. If a print was smudged, it might not be identifiable.
- Some senior staff interviewed discussed the voluntary DNA samples initiative only in regards to offenders or suspects aged seventeen years and older. They might not have been aware that the Criminal Investigations Blood Samples Act (1995) also allows for voluntary samples from fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds, with parental consent.

During 2003, when the responsibility for crime scene attendance went back to GDB, there was a period when attendance was still being left to CSAs and the jobs were piling up in the system. There was also some frustration expressed by the CSA officers that the Northern Communications Centre (Comms) was not providing enough detail about the burglary for them to be able to ascertain whether it was worthwhile for them to attend—for example, if a spade had been taken from the garden shed, or whether there had been a broken window to gain entry to the house. The CSA officers commented that they only get adequate prints off

about 5–10% of house burglaries and only about 2–5% provide DNA. A CSA explained the problem in August 2003.

*We found our strike/hit rate was going down for the simple reason we were getting shit scenes but because it was a burglary, we were supposed to go to it. We were getting scenes like garage doors left closed but unlocked and someone had simply opened up and taken a bike or chainsaw and gone. Well there was little hope there and we were getting those continuously. Or because we were so snowed under, we weren't getting to burglaries for 3 or 4 days. We were getting seminal contaminated clean up, which was understandable from a victim, windows repaired, etc. and we were struggling, we really were and nobody was listening. The stats for hits were going down as the quality of prints was poor.*

Once the GDB staff readjusted and took back responsibility to attend burglaries and call in CSA when required, the hit rate began to improve again.

#### **5.4.4 Strengths of the collection of DNA samples and fingerprints**

The Field Officers, and the CIB and LET detectives (who obtained consent for voluntary DNA samples prior to the introduction of the Field Officers), were all commended by Senior Police for their abilities in establishing good rapport with offenders and suspects and providing them appropriate rationale to provide a DNA sample.

*...it's how you word it, once you explain the situation, spend some time with them and explain that 'hey if you're not committing crimes then you've not got a problem, you know.'...that by giving their blood it probably takes them out of contention as a suspect...It's surprising the number of ones that do give us their blood, that we would otherwise never get it.*

#### **5.4.5 Future directions and suggested improvements**

- Senior Police commented that the number and quality of youth voluntary fingerprints could be improved.
- Several Detectives and the CSA section spoke of the importance of regular training for staff regarding DNA technological and legislative advances.
- Examples of advances given were:
  - new methods for collecting DNA evidence at the scene
  - recommended practices to obtain consent for voluntary DNA samples
  - recommended practices to take mouth swabs.
- Some Senior Police recommended an amendment be made to the Police Act so mouth swabs could be taken from every person arrested in the same manner as taking fingerprints. It was also commented that the ability to obtain voluntary DNA mouth swab samples from juveniles would be an advantage, with this incorporated into the amendments to the Criminal Investigations Blood Samples Act (1995).

# 6 Location-focused initiatives

The identification of 'hot' locations is a key part of the crime reduction strategy in Rotorua. Several respondents mentioned crime science theories which proposed that just 10% of the locations accounted for 80% of crime. The management of 'hot' locations is by focusing on prevention, most commonly through directed patrolling. Policing locations utilises a whole-of-Police approach and often involves community partners such as Neighbourhood Support, volunteer patrols and crime watch. Some location initiatives have been carried out by community constables in their own area, but more recently they have been larger Intel-driven exercises which involve all sections. Other initiatives involve an analysis of a crime problem in an area. The Atlas project is one described below. Another location-focused initiative is CPTED. This also involves key partners, such as the parks people in the District Council.

## 6.1 Directed patrolling

Rotorua's directed patrolling was driven by Intel, who produced electronic maps detailing the location of burglaries and other offences, such as theft from cars, from the previous week. The burglaries' time of day, property stolen, and MOs were also analysed. The maps and analysis were presented at the weekly Area focus meetings, with the subsequent tasking often involving a directed patrolling response. Staff members were informed of their section's directed patrolling responsibilities at the weekly crime meetings and daily briefings. Directed patrolling included both marked car and uniformed foot patrols. The Murupara station identified their own directed patrolling needs, and developed and manned their directed patrolling responses.

The Strategic Section and GDB conducted most of the directed patrolling. However, when the directed patrolling areas were also areas of high traffic risks the Strategic Traffic Unit directed their at-risk traffic work to the same area. Other sections also participated as available.

All staff involved in directed patrolling provided Intel with notings of activity, people, and vehicles of interest in the area. Intel monitored each section's directed patrolling response and reported this at the following focus meeting, along with the number of burglaries and other crime in the area during the directed patrol period.

### 6.1.1 Rationale for directed patrolling

Rotorua Police identified a number of benefits of directed patrolling.

- The visibility of Police in the area deters burglary and other criminal activity.
- People in neighbourhoods where crime has occurred observe the patrols and are reassured.

*Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

In the 2002 Household survey 10% of respondents mentioned Police patrols when asked what Police or community activities they were aware of in their neighbourhood that aimed to reduce burglary. In the 2004 survey the figures were similar but there was a significant increase in the percentage who knew about informal neighbourhood networks, from 1% to 7%.

In 2002 56% of respondents wanted Police to do more to make them feel safer from burglary. Of these respondents, 64% wanted more Police visibility or patrolling. The figures were similar in the 2004 survey, although more people wanted a faster response from the Police (5% in 2002, 25% in 2004).

- Areas where burglaries were occurring were also likely to be areas where burglars lived, providing an opportunity to gather information about sighted movements of recidivist offenders.
- The chances of an offender being stopped when driving to or from a burglary were increased, and they might also still have stolen property in the car.
- Impounding vehicles from disqualified drivers could mean that burglars are deprived of their vehicles, impeding their burglary offending.
- A reduction in crime in the area may continue following the directed patrol period.
- More efficient use is made of staff time by focusing activity on areas that might yield results, rather than patrolling randomly.

Rotorua Police discussed several directed patrols where no burglaries occurred in the area during the directed patrol periods, and others where the burglary offenders were apprehended.

A Housing New Zealand representative reported that many of their Fordlands tenants felt targeted by the increased Police presence, and believed it gave a negative impression of the area. Housing New Zealand, however, endeavoured to make Housing New Zealand residents aware of the positive aspects of the Police presence.

### **6.1.2 Barriers to directed patrolling**

Some barriers to directed patrolling that were identified included:

- reactive policing demands, such as domestic incidents or road accidents, might dominate a shift, allowing no time for directed patrolling
- drivers using their full beams to warn other drivers of Police traffic patrols allowed burglary offenders to avoid the patrol
- results were often short-term, with the area's crime returning to pre-patrol levels shortly after the directed patrol period.

### **6.1.3 Strengths of directed patrolling**

Senior Police considered it a strength that community patrol groups and many of the other Police sections, particularly the Traffic section, assisted the Strategic Section and GDB with directed patrols. District Intel argued that the strength was not so much the directed patrols, but the whole-of-Police approach, which is effective.

## **6.2 Community patrols**

Rotorua had two community patrol groups that conducted patrols in residential areas experiencing crime problems. Community Watch and Western Heights Cycle Patrol were groups of volunteer patrollers who observed for any suspicious people, behaviour or motor vehicles in the area and reported this information back to Police.

*We are here for the community, to provide a community service and it is more about being a deterrent than anything else. We would like to see ourselves more as public relations officers.*

All the patrollers were trained by the Rotorua Police in personal safety and how to make effective Intel notings, and underwent Police clearance before commencing patrols. The patrollers wore highly visible uniforms clearly identifying who they were. Prior to the Rotorua Police restructuring, the Police provided the community patrols with information on an as-required basis. Later, following the increase of the Intel section, the groups met weekly with Intel. Intel provided direction on the areas the groups were to focus their patrols in for the week (particular areas in Western Heights for the Western Heights patrol group) and discussed suspicious people and motor vehicles to look out for.

### **6.2.1 Community Watch**

Community Watch was developed by the Rotorua Iwi Liaison Officer and has been managed by the Aotearoa Employment and Economic Development Corporation since 1998. Community Watch was initially established to patrol tourist areas, but had been extended into other areas of Rotorua.

*...gradually we've moved into other areas to take the heat off the Police. They are pretty busy at the moment. Lack of resources, mainly manpower, so we try to fill in those little gaps that are a nuisance to the Police, take up a lot of their time.*

Community Watch had six patrollers to conduct both car and foot patrols, with the car patrols able to cover large areas of Rotorua. The patrollers were unemployment beneficiaries, paid up to \$80 a week to supplement their benefit. Eventually with the support of trusts and charities some were able to go off the benefit and patrol full time.

Community Watch had been contracted to the Rotorua District Council, who funded their patrol cars and provided some ongoing funding. Additional funding was provided by charitable trusts, with the Rotorua Police paying their fuel costs. Later, the group had experienced financial difficulties due to so many other groups seeking funding from the same place. Changes in government policies relating to 'work for the dole' schemes also affected

their group. By 2004, it was being sponsored by a security firm and was having difficulty attracting high-quality volunteers.

### **6.2.2 Western Heights Cycle Patrol Group**

The former Western Heights community constable and the former Rotorua Safer Community Council representative established the Western Heights Cycle Patrol Group in 2001 to address the high levels of burglary, theft from cars and property damage occurring in the Western Heights suburb during weekends. The group also wanted to promote the message that they were proud of living in Western Heights and wanted to help their community become a safe place.

The group patrolled the Western Heights suburb Friday and Saturday nights from 9.30pm to 3.00am. Being a cycle patrol enabled a quiet approach and covered more ground than foot patrols, while still enabling patrollers to hear well in the open air. The Community Constable recruited eight volunteer patrollers, who worked either the Friday or the Saturday night. Before the shift commenced the group supervisor briefed the patrollers on which streets had recently experienced crime, and the time period they should patrol those streets. The volunteers patrolled in pairs and maintained regular contact with the supervisor via cell phones. The supervisor had a Police radio and contacted the Police if any assistance was required. The patrollers were also able to call 111 if necessary.

The Western Heights Cycle Patrol Group received an initial grant from the Southern Regions Gaming Trust for equipment. Rotorua Police provided use of the Western Heights Community Policing Centre as their base. The Brookland Liquor Centre Pub and the Safer Community Council also provided some funding, while a local cycle shop provided free maintenance for the bikes. The group was accountable to the community constable, and reported monthly to their management committee. The patrol group went through a period of disorganisation after the loss of the coordinator and the transfer of the community constable. Some of the group wanted to change to using car patrols as there had been some instances of violence towards people on bikes and volunteers felt insecure.

### **6.2.3 Rationale for community patrols**

Many Rotorua Police, justice sector and community representatives reported that burglaries had noticeably decreased in Western Heights since the introduction of the cycle patrol group. Rotorua Police also acknowledged Community Watch's contribution to the directed patrol's success in reducing burglaries and other crimes in the 'hot' locations, particularly the rural patrols, which would have been too time-consuming for Police to conduct.

Rotorua Police felt the Western Heights Cycle Patrol Group's concentrated efforts in the Western Heights suburb had become known to offenders, who consequently decided there was too much risk involved in offending in that suburb.

#### **6.2.4 Barriers to community patrols**

The following barriers to community patrols were identified.

- The community patrol groups were not able to obtain feedback from Police regarding any subsequent action resulting from information they had reported, yet success stories were seen as integral for keeping volunteers motivated and promoting community support.
- A lot of the success of the Western Heights Cycle Patrol Group was attributed to the Western Heights Community Constable and the Safer Community Council representative's involvement. However, the Western Heights community constable had since been relocated to another position without replacement, and the Safer Community Council position remained unfilled for a large part of 2002.
- A problem facing many similar groups is how to recruit, select and maintain a pool of quality volunteers. They set standards which meet the approval of Police, and need to ensure that they are well protected through training and equipment. Groups are heavily reliant on having a highly motivated coordinator, secure funding and a stable relationship with Police. If any of these factors change it has a negative impact.
- The groups were not being funded sufficiently for them to be able to operate consistently.

#### **6.2.5 Strengths of community patrols**

The following were identified as strengths of community patrols.

- They fostered high local ownership of the community's problems.
- Community Watch trained all their volunteers and supported them to complete the security guard training course—to level one, two and three. Many of the volunteers had completed these courses, got experience through Community Watch and subsequently found work in local security firms.
- Both patrol groups experienced a good relationship with the Rotorua Police, who provided a lot of information to assist their observations during patrols.

#### **6.2.6 Future directions and suggested improvements**

The following ideas were discussed.

- With a large reduction in weekend crime in Western Heights, the cycle patrol group was considering changing to a midweek patrol. Rotorua was also examining the possibility of implementing the Western Heights type of voluntary cycle patrol groups in other suburbs.
- Communication is important and the Community Watch coordinator suggested that if they were to have Police radios they would be more effective.
- The Housing New Zealand representative suggested more community patrol groups be used for directed patrols in communities that do not have a positive perception of Police presence, or were concerned about the impression frequent Police presence gave their community.

## **6.3 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design**

An initiative that Rotorua Police are increasingly involved with in partnership with the District Council is CPTED. Several Police have completed a training course in CPTED (provided by the District Council) and most people who spoke of the initiative were very excited about the success of environmental interventions.

Once an area of high crime activity is identified, a crime and safety audit is undertaken. This identifies problems such as street lighting, poor visibility due to plantings, and the design of footpaths and footbridges through reserves. The solutions will involve:

- changing tree plantings
- pruning foliage higher to allow greater visibility
- providing better street lighting
- providing visible Police patrols.

In the CBD the Police and Council have also considered the layout of shops to provide strategies which minimise the risk of crime.

Police reported several examples of successful crime reduction through CPTED initiatives. Despite the fact that the initial projects have been within the CBD and in tourist areas, the processes can equally be applied to residential streets and new developments.

### **6.3.1 Strengths of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design**

Crime in the hospital car park was greatly reduced as a result of improved fencing, removal of low trees and better lighting. The car park at the Polynesian pools was also being hit by offenders. The Police met with management and several initiatives were implemented:

- reception reminded people not to leave valuables in the car
- spa staff patrolled the area
- when thefts were reported the management undertook to fax the site of the theft to the Police so that they could build up a crime pattern.

When this initiative was undertaken, thefts dropped from 16 in three months to one in two months.

One aspect of CPTED commented on was that it involved businesses in a direct way and was a good example of a working partnership to reduce crime. Operators in the tourism and hospitality industry were keen to participate and when they saw the benefits realised that CPTED was something they could do themselves with support from Police and City Council.

## 6.4 Neighbourhood Support

Rotorua Police considered Neighbourhood Support to be one of their key community partnerships in their burglary reduction efforts. The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator was housed within the Police station, and considered their role a link or interface between the public and the Police.

In 2002, the Rotorua Neighbourhood Support Coordinator had built up the network of Neighbourhood Support groups from approximately 420 to 470, encompassing 6,590 households (28% of all dwellings<sup>3</sup> in the Rotorua Police Area). She had assisted other informal neighbourhood networks not listed as official Neighbourhood Support groups. By mid-2004, the number of groups had increased to 500, encompassing 6,700 homes.

### *Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

The 2002 Household Survey found that 24% of the respondents were members of Neighbourhood Support (including Rural Support), with significantly more membership in Rotorua than the average of the other three Police Areas surveyed. Those who were not members generally had not been approached to join, rather than having a definite reason against joining. In the 2004 survey the percentage of those who belonged to Neighbourhood Support Groups had dropped to 18%.

Neighbourhood Support employed an additional part-time Coordinator to assist with the increased work resulting from the increase in the number of Neighbourhood Support groups. Rotorua Neighbourhood Support also employed a data entry operator for two hours work each week.

Neighbourhood Support was promoted through articles in local newspapers, information to burglary victims, suggestions from Police, and word of mouth.

When a new Neighbourhood Support group was established, an inaugural meeting was usually held where the Neighbourhood Support Coordinator explained the purpose and functions of Neighbourhood Support, and a community constable talked about security and explained the process for reporting crime or information to the Police. In regards to burglary, household security advice was provided, and members were informed of common MOs used in Rotorua, at-risk property, and any other elements of burglary in Rotorua that could identify where their residences might be at risk for burglary. Members were also encouraged to record their property serial numbers and use invisible security pens to mark their property (infrared lamps were able to detect the invisible pen markings on goods).

As Neighbourhood Support was aware that a lot of burglaries were committed by juveniles and youth, the groups were also provided the phone numbers for the Truancy Officers and encouraged to contact them if they saw school-aged children in the area during school hours. The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator used a variety of Police information to develop a picture of the most vulnerable locations and common security shortfalls for burglary.

<sup>3</sup> 2001 Census Information matched to Police boundaries indicated a total of 23,496 private dwellings in the Rotorua Police Area.

When the Neighbourhood Support Coordinator received information from Police regarding a recent burglary, she contacted the coordinators for the Neighbourhood Support groups in and near that area via phone, fax or email, and provided information about:

- the general location of the burglary
- approximate date and time
- how entry was obtained
- descriptions of any suspicious cars or people.

Members who noticed any suspicious activity were encouraged to ring Police directly. The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator reported that she gave as much information to the groups as possible, and as often as she could, believing this also served as a reminder of Neighbourhood Support's importance in the community and maintained members' motivation.

The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator attended the Rotorua weekly crime meetings, often providing a brief report. She also attended the weekly Rotorua Police Area focus meetings, each time agreeing to a task to help address current crime problems, which often included burglary (see Section 4.2.1.1, Area focus meetings, for further information). The task depended on the situation; however, a typical example of Neighbourhood Support's response was:

- contacting all the coordinators for each Neighbourhood Support group in the focus area
- informing them of the focus problem
- requesting they inform all their members that the Police were focusing on that area
- encouraging the reporting of any information that might assist.

The tasks also sometimes included letterbox drops to:

- draw residents' attention to the problem
- provide security advice
- encourage surveillance and reporting of any suspicious activities to the Police.

During 2002 Neighbourhood Support also assisted the Utuhina community with their successful lobbying of the Rotorua District Council to close a footbridge the LET had identified as providing easy access for burglary offenders to nearby houses. Intel also assisted by providing an analysis of the problem.

The rural southern districts in the Rotorua Police Area were covered by Rural Support. The Community Constables Manager provided a monthly newsletter, *From the Files of the Country Copper*, to every house in the rural southern districts. The newsletter included:

- a report on rural crime trends
- registration numbers of suspicious vehicles
- where appropriate, details of people charged.

The newsletter and any other information Rotorua Police needed to distribute to rural residents was delivered on the day by the rural delivery postman. The Rotorua District Council also used the Rural Support membership list for civil defence purposes, as it was considered the most accurate list of residents in Rotorua's rural southern districts.

#### **6.4.1 Barriers to Neighbourhood Support**

The main barrier to the work of Neighbourhood Support was a lack of ongoing resourcing for the scheme, which received no central government funding in any form. In 2002 the group had secured an ongoing contract from Rotorua District Council and some funding from the Energy Charitable Trust in order to fund the Coordinator's salary and some of the overheads, approximately one-third of Rotorua Neighbourhood Support's required funding. Rotorua Police provided the Neighbourhood Support office and equipment. In 2004, the new coordinator was applying for a full salary from the District Council.

With the Rotorua Area having a large number of established Neighbourhood Support groups, there was so much work involved in maintaining the commitment to those groups that it reduced the time available to develop further groups.

The Western Heights community constable discussed potential cultural barriers with the traditional Neighbourhood Support structure, as non-European communities often felt too uncomfortable to enter homes of people they did not know very well. The Pacific Development Trust thought that there were unlikely to be any Pacific Island people involved in Neighbourhood Support groups (4.1% of Rotorua's population were Pacific people), and that it would be difficult to encourage many members of the Pacific community to practice household security as it was very important to have their homes always open for family and friends.

The Western Heights community constable had attended some local marae to discuss Neighbourhood Support principles and alternatives for the Maori communities (35.5% of Rotorua's population was Maori).

#### **6.4.2 Strengths of Neighbourhood Support**

The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator believed Neighbourhood Support groups made an important contribution to Rotorua's burglary reduction efforts.

*We are the eyes and ears of the Police. We are the people that are reporting suspicious activity. The Police have to fight crime but they can't fight it unless they know about it, someone has got to tell them and it is people like Neighbourhood Support that are doing the telling and being helpful in giving information.*

#### *Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

Both the 2002 and 2004 Household Surveys found that Neighbourhood Support was the most commonly named activity with an aim to reduce burglary (49% of all respondents in 2002, 44% in 2004), and it was mentioned by significantly more people in Rotorua than the average of the other three Police Areas surveyed.

All of the Rotorua Police interviewed were aware of the Neighbourhood Support activities and convinced of their effectiveness, reporting that more than 90% of the burglaries in Rotorua occurred outside of Neighbourhood Support areas.

*It is well known that Neighbourhood Support groups are effective in reducing the rate of burglaries because a lot of burglars won't operate in the areas where these groups are working.*

Several Police mentioned how useful Neighbourhood Support was when they were targeting a location with a crime problem. Within a few hours the coordinator is able to gather volunteers and do pamphlet drops highlighting an issue of concern. A Neighbourhood Support person interviewed in 2004 said the following.

*This last fortnight, we have put out 1700 letters...one was to do with a kidnapping in the area, then there was a serious sexual assault in one of the areas, and I sent out just on 1000 letters into that area.*

Neighbourhood Support was considered effective on a number of different levels.

- It encouraged a sense of pride and ownership of local neighbourhood.
- It broke down the belief that the Police were too busy to receive calls.
- The public was encouraged to observe and record any suspicious activity, and report it to Police.
- It helped people to feel safer in their neighbourhood.
- The public had a sense of working in partnership with Police in preventing crime and the Police had a sense that the public supported their work.
- By notifying residents soon after a burglary occurred, Police could receive information leading to an arrest.
- By receiving information about a recent burglary in the neighbourhood, community members became more vigilant and more security conscious; this could prevent further burglaries in the neighbourhood.
- Those who did not wish to join Neighbourhood Support were still encouraged through newspaper articles, letterbox drops, etc. to be vigilant and assist Police.

*Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

The 2002 Household Survey findings showed that 93% (113 of 122) of Rotorua Neighbourhood Support members considered Neighbourhood Support to be helpful (87% in 2004). The most common reason for finding it helpful was the general feeling of strengthening communities/getting to know neighbours (77%), followed by Neighbourhood Support making them feel safer (43%). The percentage of people who said that membership in Neighbourhood Support made them feel safer increased to 68% in 2004. Thirty percent found Neighbourhood Support helpful because they found out about local burglaries and 12% because they got to meet the Police. These two reasons were mentioned by significantly more respondents in Rotorua than the average of the other three Police Areas surveyed.

### **6.4.3 Future directions and suggested improvements**

The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator was looking to develop more groups in the areas that were frequently targeted for burglary and other crimes. Neighbourhood Support will assist Housing New Zealand with their Fordlands Community Renewal Project in 2003. The Neighbourhood Support Coordinator saw this as an opportunity to develop Neighbourhood Support groups in the housing complexes involved, with Housing New Zealand also keen to then extend Neighbourhood Support to their individual houses.

Neighbourhood Support and the Rotorua Police were looking at ways to implement a systematic feedback system from Police to ensure that Neighbourhood Support members who report information are informed of any subsequent outcome.

The Pacific Island Development Trust suggested Police and Neighbourhood Support attend one of their community meetings to provide crime prevention advice and discuss Neighbourhood Support principles and alternatives for the Pacific community.

## **6.5 Other location-focused initiatives**

### **6.5.1 Schools as community**

A strategy being developed by Police is to look at the number of offences within 200 metres of schools and invite the school to join in crime prevention measures through an 0800 number which students can call to report suspicious behaviour.

### **6.5.2 Atlas initiative**

In 2004 Intel undertook an exercise designed by District Intel to analyse the crime problems in terms of a location identified by the team. The purpose was to practice analytical skills and use technology in a range of ways. The initiative, called Atlas, was an in-depth look at the Homedale area, which had been identified as a 'hot' location.

The key elements of this exercise were that it:

- involved looking at that whole community rather than individual incidents
- involved other partners—District Council and community and government agencies; this joint process increased the understanding of the role each had to play in crime reduction.

Comments made about the strengths of the Atlas project were that it involved the community and a wider source was drawn on to get information—taxi and bus drivers, shop owners and power company meter readers. A great deal of information was collected and analysed and strategies were devised to address crime issues in that area. Some of the initiatives were:

- improving street lighting
- placing traffic islands in cul de sacs to avoid burnouts
- identifying rates of domestic violence and transiency

- encouraging Housing NewZealand to educate tenants in home security
- improving environmental design in reserves.

Barriers to the project included a concern that the systems and staff were not set up well enough to be able to pick up and run with the initiatives that came out of Atlas. Police also commented that the exercise was very time-intensive for the community constable and the Intel analyst.

# 7 Victim-focused initiatives

Rotorua Police traditionally relied heavily upon Victim Support to provide services to victims of crime, but in recent years Police had been exploring some other initiatives themselves which focused on crime prevention through target hardening. Target hardening measures are those which aim to deter crime through making the intended victim 'too hard' to reach.

## 7.1 Victim Support

In 2004 Rotorua Victim Support had a coordinator paid for 25 hours a week, and approximately 30 volunteers. Victim Support was funded by the Ministry of Justice, as well as from other funds and grants. They provided a service 24 hours per day, seven days per week.

Approximately 90% of Rotorua Victim Support's work was with burglary victims. The GDB called Victim Support if a burglary victim required immediate support. Intel provided the Victim Support Coordinator with copies of the burglary offence reports on a daily basis. The Victim Support office recorded the name, address, phone number, burglary type, date of the burglary, incident reference number, and name of the officer in charge before posting the burglary offence report to one of the Victim Support volunteers. The Victim Support volunteers then rang or visited every residential burglary victim, or sent a letter when they were unable to make contact.

When the volunteer contacted the burglary victim they discussed the burglary and established if the victim required assistance in any form, including whether they wanted to become involved in Neighbourhood Support. Victim Support passed on the details of burglary victims who were interested in joining Neighbourhood Support to the Neighbourhood Support Coordinator. For distressed victims the volunteer ascertained if they had support people available, and if not, provided referrals for counselling. Very few burglary victims, however, required counselling referrals. The volunteer informed the Victim Support Coordinator if they believed any follow-up assistance was required. The burglary victim was also asked if they had received a burglary attendance and information pack from the Police. If they had not received one, Victim Support sent one out; however, this rarely occurred.

Victim Support and Neighbourhood Support developed the burglary attendance and information packs, for which Victim Support provided:

- the *Reducing the Risk of Burglary* booklet
- a magnetised security checklist that identified good security practices
- a serial number record sheet
- a pamphlet describing Victim Support's general services.

### **7.1.1 Stolen property serial numbers**

Rotorua Victim Support had two volunteers who came in once or twice a week and contacted burglary victims to obtain the serial numbers of their stolen property.

The volunteers also asked if anything else was stolen that the victim did not realise at the time their burglary offence report was completed. The serial numbers and additional stolen property information were fed back to the Police.

### **7.1.2 Target hardening programme**

The target hardening programme (run by Victim Support aimed to prevent repeat burglary victimisation and increase victims' sense of security by installing locks or alarms in lower socio-economic households that had been burgled twice or more. To receive target hardening, the claimant had to:

- have been burgled twice or more at their current residence in the past twelve months (including burglary attempts)
- belong to a lower socio-economic group (generally determined by having a current Community Services Card, although a discretionary clause did allow for those who did not have a card but were on a low income to be considered)
- have the approval of the owner of the house if it was a rental property.

Although it was encouraged, the claimant did not have to have reported all their previous burglaries to the Police in order to qualify.

Victim Support established from the burglary offence reports whether a burglary victim was a repeat victim and then provided them with a target hardening programme pamphlet to determine whether they met the criteria, requesting they contact Victim Support if they did.

Victim Support had three trained assessors who confirmed whether the burglary victim met the target hardening programme criteria, and then assessed their current security. Chubb Security then installed the required locks or alarms.

#### *Household Survey (2002 and 2004)*

The Household Surveys found that significantly fewer Rotorua respondents had double or dead-locks (51% in 2002 and 52% in 2004), windows with keys (10% in 2002 and 11% in 2004) or alarms (35% in 2002 and 30% in 2004) than the average of the other three Police Areas surveyed.

In both 2002 and 2004 more than two thirds of respondents believed it would be easy for a burglar to get into their home. The most common reason mentioned for not doing more to protect their home from possible burglary was that they could not afford it.

Burglary victims were less likely to have had almost all types of security measures at the time of their most recent burglary, compared to all respondents at the time of the interview.

### **7.1.3 Barriers to Victim Support**

Rotorua Police used to have a Victim Support module that Police officers new to Rotorua participated in. The Victim Support Coordinator reported that the module provided a great opportunity to discuss what Victim Support did in Rotorua; however, it didn't appear to be run anymore. The Victim Support Coordinator had asked the Rotorua Police Victim Support liaison person to keep her informed about it, but had heard nothing further.

Data entry and recovery systems did not always allow Victim Support access to the information about burglaries in a timely fashion.

By December 2002 there had only been two target hardening programme recipients. The Victim Support Coordinator reported that a lot of the repeat burglary victims in Rotorua did not meet the target hardening programme criteria. Many were either not in a lower socio-economic bracket, or tended to move frequently—thus they had not lived at their current residence for the past twelve months.

The Western Heights Community Constable was aware of the target hardening programme, and reported that he was supposed to be one of the target hardening programme assessors. However, at the time of his interview in April 2002 he had not yet been approached by Victim Support about being an assessor.

The District Commander felt that the Rotorua Police could assist Victim Support in improving the target hardening programme. Rotorua Police believed the target hardening programme could have a big impact on burglary if it was run properly. One area where Rotorua Police identified they could assist the target hardening programme further was by improving their identification of repeat burglary victims.

### **7.1.4 Strengths of Victim Support**

The Area Controller believed the Victim Support services in Rotorua were strong. A GDB Manager considered the Victim Support service to be vital, adding that Victim Support could assist with calming a person down to the point where the Police were able to speak to the person about the incident and obtain the information required to assist their investigation.

The Victim Support Coordinator reported that in most cases burglary victims were very appreciative that Victim Support was there to listen to them, without offering advice or being judgmental of what had happened. Even when burglary victims felt the burglary was a minor incident, many appreciated Victim Support taking the time to contact them. A community representative who had experienced a burglary reported:

*I remember when I was burgled they [Victim Support] rang me to ask if I needed support, which I felt I didn't, but it was nice to be asked.*

The Victim Support Coordinator believed Rotorua Victim Support was very lucky to have always had an open door policy with Rotorua Police of all ranks, enabling Victim Support to get information as and when they required it.

## **7.2 Other victim-focused initiatives**

An initiative called Insecure Premises Project was carried out by District Intel, Rotorua Police, Victim Support and Neighbourhood Support in 2004. This involved a house-to-house survey and a brochure drop in one neighbourhood. The survey was carried out by a visual check from the street to see what windows were open. People on the street were asked about home security and given a pamphlet encouraging them to take better security measures.

This initiative raised several issues. One was a cultural one where people kept the house unlocked so that whanau members would be able to drop by. This led to the idea that the Iwi Liaison officer might design a presentation about leaving the key with a whanau member. The message would be that crime is being encouraged through providing an opportunity to offend.

In 2004, Police were considering other ways to work with victims to reduce their vulnerability to crime. Several respondents within the Police expressed concern that victims of burglary were not being well served due to the delays in attendance and the lack of feedback about whether an offender had been caught or property recovered.

# 8 Property-focused initiatives

## 8.1 Liaison with second-hand dealers

Rotorua Police considered liaison with second-hand dealers an important strategy in disrupting stolen property markets.

### *Household Survey 2002 and 2004*

Property was stolen in 89% of respondents' completed burglaries in 2002 and 95% in 2004. In more than 85% of the cases no property had yet been recovered.

Second-hand dealers were required to work within the Secondhand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act 2004, which required dealers to:

- be licensed
- maintain a register of the source of all items bought
- retain certain items for 14 days before on-selling.

Before this legislation came in, in April 2005, they came under the Secondhand Dealers Act 1963. This Act had required them to hold certain property for a month. The list of items which the Act covered was very out of date.

The LET visited the second-hand dealers on a monthly basis to inspect each dealer's register and property, and obtain a list of the sellers to identify any regular sellers or burglary suspects. They also informed the second-hand dealers of any people on the list who could potentially be selling them stolen property. Following the July 2002 restructuring, it became one of the Field Officers' tasks to monitor the second-hand dealers.

When investigating suspects for particular burglary cases, the Field Officers compiled a list of the stolen property from the burglaries and checked with local second-hand dealers to see if they had received any of that property, and if so who from.

A second-hand dealer who was interviewed reported that they rang the Police whenever they had a seller trying to sell them property they suspected was stolen, to which Police responded as soon as possible. The second-hand dealer employed delaying tactics with the seller in an attempt to keep them in the store until the Police arrived.

*We say to the offender, leave the goods with us for a little while; we have to make some enquiries as to how much they are worth, on some sort of pretext. Sometimes you can hold them there, sometimes they scarpa, they get wind of it. But on occasions, we have had some great results.*

They also rang the Police when they had purchased an item they later suspected might be stolen property, for example if the true owner identified it in the shop. In this situation the Police generally responded within one to three days. The Police removed any suspected stolen property either rung in by the second-hand dealer, or identified during an inspection.

*We see cooperation with the Police as an integral part of our business. We can't operate successfully without their cooperation and input.*

### **8.1.1 Rationale for second-hand dealer liaison**

Police recognised that a significant volume of stolen property was sold on through second-hand dealers, and that the provision of strict licensing and monitoring as well as good communication and trust was essential if they wanted to limit this traffic. They also regarded second-hand dealers as a source of information on offenders.

The Secondhand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Act 2004, which replaced the Secondhand Dealers Act (1963) and the Pawnbrokers Act (1908), included the following features:

- tougher licensing and certification for second-hand dealers
- requirement for dealers to sight approved identification and record contact details and the signature of all people selling goods to them
- an updated schedule of at-risk goods to be retained—the previous schedule included items such as gramophones, travel rugs, and typewriters and did not include appliances that had become common household items since 1963, such as computers
- improved Police powers to access records and inspect goods held by dealers
- harsher penalties for non-compliance with the legislation.

### **8.1.2 Barriers to liaison with second-hand dealers**

The following aspects were described as barriers to effective liaison with dealers.

#### *Household Surveys*

In 2002, 35% of the 500 Rotorua respondents had placed security markings on property, 29% had noted down the serial numbers of electrical property, and 16% had photographed small property items.

- Few burglary victims provided serial numbers for their stolen property, so there was rarely a match with serial numbers of property being sold to dealers.
- Following the July 2002 restructuring, Rotorua's liaison with dealers did not appear to be consistent with all dealers in Rotorua, providing sellers of stolen property the opportunity to take stolen property to less frequently monitored dealers.

- Late in 2004, the clerk who undertook the liaison with this sector left the job and had not been replaced. The strength of the practice was dependent on having someone consistent to develop and maintain the relationship.
- The second-hand dealers reported it was very rare to receive reparation from burglary offenders, due to:
  - the Police not asking for reparation for the second-hand dealer
  - judges not awarding reparation
  - reparation being ordered but the offender not paying.

The reason reparation for the second-hand dealer was not requested or the judge did not award it was generally not provided. The second-hand dealer had also never been asked to participate in any family group conferences (FGCs) or restorative justice meetings for burglary offenders who sold them stolen property.

- There were often delays in the Police establishing if suspected stolen property seized from a second-hand dealer was stolen or not. This resulted in delays in returning confirmed stolen property to its owners, and by the time it was returned it might have been replaced by insurance or by the owners themselves.
- The second-hand dealer interviewed believed the Privacy Act prevented a lot of information sharing between Police and second-hand dealers regarding suspected sellers of stolen property. This information could assist with preventing the purchase of stolen property, and apprehending offenders.
- There was little communication between the different second-hand dealers in Rotorua. This could identify prolific property sellers, who would be likely sellers of stolen property.
- Several people commented that most stolen property was sold on through gangs or their affiliates, through 'tinnie' houses and often swapped for drugs. Due to the current Police priority not being on drug offenders, gangs, or organised crime, it was felt that this created a large gap for burglars.

### **8.1.3 Strengths of second-hand dealer liaison**

Police and a second-hand dealer interviewed identified the following benefits from liaison work:

- ability to examine suspicious goods or sellers and identify some stolen goods before buying, thus avoiding buying goods that might be confiscated later at a financial loss to the second-hand dealer
- offenders were deterred from selling to dealers who were careful about what they bought and who they bought from
- stolen property could be identified and recovered for return to the owners
- some burglars were apprehended through stolen property being identified, which could result in clearances of other burglaries or the uncovering of a stolen property distribution network
- Police checks of second-hand registers could identify new sellers of stolen property.

### **8.1.4 Future directions and suggested improvements**

The second-hand dealer interviewed would like to receive more detailed information from Rotorua Police regarding stolen property.

*It is quality information we need, not quantity, so that things can actually be identified. We like nothing better than to have the information, recognise stolen property, ring the boys in blue and get them down to arrest the offender; that is great.*

Some Police suggest that more work should be done on other receivers, such as gangs, and items sold through the internet.

## **8.2 Other proposed property-focused initiatives**

Unlike other Police Areas, the burglary scan showed that the number one most frequently stolen item in Rotorua during 2001 was electrical goods, rather than cash.

### *Household Survey (2002, 2004)*

In the 2002 Household Survey 89% of the respondents who experienced completed burglaries had property stolen (95% in 2004). Of these, 47% had personal effects or jewellery stolen; 45% electronic equipment; 38% tools; 33% food; 24% furniture, linen, or household goods; 16% sports equipment; and 13% cash, cheques or credit cards. Significantly more Rotorua respondents had tools stolen than the average of the other three Police Areas surveyed. In the 2004 survey, the percentage that had electronic equipment, personal effects and tools stolen had decreased, whilst the percentage of those who had cash, household items, and sports equipment stolen had risen.

The District Commander believed this information presented good opportunities to disrupt stolen property markets.

It was also suggested that Rotorua Police and Neighbourhood Support organise another distribution of security pens to encourage residents to mark their property.

Senior Rotorua Police also believed there were networks of stolen property receivers outside of Rotorua, and felt more work needed to be done in identifying and breaking up these receiving rings.

The need for improvements in the taking of ORs was also mentioned. When an officer recorded the information about stolen property, they didn't always include the make, model, and serial number of the item.

# 9 General crime reduction initiatives

This section describes Police structures which seek to reduce crime across all categories. It also describes community burglary reduction initiatives and other justice agencies' crime reduction programmes and outlines key partnerships Police have in crime reduction. It finishes with a description of the Police relationship with the justice sector.

## 9.1 Police structures relating to crime reduction

The following Police structures are those which are seen to have a focus on general crime reduction, including a reduction in burglaries. They include measures designed to reduce youth offending and initiatives for Maori offenders.

### 9.1.1 Youth offending

According to Youth Services, 60% of all crime in Rotorua is committed by under-17-year-olds, and 80% by under-20-year-olds. Juvenile offenders were said to be responsible for approximately 50% of all burglaries.

### 9.1.2 Youth and Community Services

Rotorua Police had community constables based in Western Heights, West End, Murupara, Central, Ngongotaha and Reporoa. Community constables were active in a range of crime reduction activities. They carried out truancy patrols, organised volunteer patrols and were active in developing Neighbourhood Support groups in their areas.

Youth and Community Services operates with a Sergeant, six constables and two youth workers, and deals with approximately 2000 young offenders per year. Youth Services provides first-time offenders with an opportunity to go through an informal FGC and a range of diversion programmes. The diversion programmes are operated by Mana Social Services. This option aims to have young offenders experience an immediate intervention, an opportunity which is often lost through the formal system, which takes several months. However, for regular offenders and more serious cases, the formal FGC structure is activated. In 2002 the Rotorua Police became more proactive in arresting first-time offenders rather than warning them. This meant they could take their fingerprints and have Youth Aid follow up with parents.

The OC Youth and Community Services has a practice of entering all youth offending into the NIA system by 8.00am each morning so that Intel has up-to-date information for their daily briefings.

### **9.1.3 Youth Development Project**

Youth and Community Services also operates a youth development project with two social workers and a constable. This programme aims to make early interventions with young offenders and move them away from a career in crime. The project, initially funded by Crime Prevention Unit, started in May 2003 and was reviewed twice in 2004. It involves working more intensively with the whanau/families of offenders with the aim of developing structures to support them moving away from criminal behaviour.

There was disagreement between the programme aims and head office about the target group. Police Headquarters was said to want the youth workers to work with the serious youth offenders and this did not work out successfully, resulting in both youth workers leaving the project. Many of the families are transient and the young people are moved away from the area and lost track of. Many of the government youth justice programmes have criteria which make it very difficult to put youth offenders on the programmes.

### **9.1.4 Truancy initiatives**

The Rotorua Police also initiated several truancy operations during the 2002–2004 period.

Each year the Police mounted a ‘round-up’ programme. This would involve picking up young people and taking them home, and serving the parents with a letter. If the youth was picked up again then parents would be served a second letter, and on serving of the second letter Police prepared a prosecution for the parents. By the end of 2004, one such prosecution had been made against parents.

The community constables undertook truancy operations within their areas. This involved becoming familiar with the schools in their area and what the school requirements were. They would then go into the city looking for young people who should be at school and return them. If the truants were known to be offenders, the constable would take them to the station and interview them first before returning them to school. The return to school in a Police car in front of everyone was seen to be a deterrent. The constable would also seek to have voluntary fingerprints taken with the parents’ permission.

There was not a high correspondence found between burglary and truancy. According to a study carried out by Youth Services in 2004, many of the juvenile offenders on the Police records were not actually enrolled in any of the schools.

The Youth Services OC did some research following up top truants from Rotorua high schools from five years ago and ran them through the criminal database. Very few of the 100 names he checked had serious offences on their record—four had shoplifting, several were runaways, and one had been charged with assault. He then went through the highest offender list and found that none of them were enrolled. This provided a clear distinction between truants and non-enrolled young people.

This distinction led to the practice of enrolling the young offenders at school so that they were in the system. The school would then provide an exemption certificate for the young person and they became eligible for placement on a training course.

One of the strategies that the Rotorua District Council was hoping to implement was a truancy-free CBD. That would mean implementation of a truancy-free area. It has already been in operation in Rotorua in the suburbs, which anecdotally has had some good results.

*So what that would entail is Council, schools, Police, and retailers all working together to create these truancy-free areas. For retailers this means putting signs in their windows that 'this is a truancy-free area—we support young people in their education' and refusing to serve people, rightly, that look like they should be involved in education, so people that look like they are under 16. Then that would need to be backed up by Truancy Officers in different schools and if there are different truants identified that there is a communication back to that school so that they can tell which school they are from, and also to the Police. It is about tying everyone's role into one workable project.*

### **9.1.5 Comments and suggestions about youth initiatives**

Comments were made about the need to have a higher focus on youth offending as this was such a prevalent aspect of Rotorua crime. The OC Youth Services believes that a Youth Crime team structure like the one in Christchurch would help to reduce crime as such a team would be able to respond to the behaviour of young offenders. Another suggestion was that an offender targeting project like 'Fifty-two Pick up'<sup>4</sup> be operated with youth offenders. The Police holding a target file would be required to visit the young person every day at school and be proactive about supporting them in sports activities or programmes such as drug rehabilitation.

There were several complaints about some of the training courses being operated in Rotorua whereby young people were enrolled but then left to their own devices. This provided an environment conducive to crime in the CBD.

There was a gap identified in the area of drug and alcohol services for young people of 10, 11 and 12 years of age. Substance abuse by this age group was a problem, but most of the treatment programmes were for older kids.

### **9.1.6 Initiatives for Maori offenders**

According to the Rotorua Iwi Liaison officer, of 200 people charged at Rotorua station per week, 180 are Maori. Charge sheets at Rotorua record data on iwi/hapu affiliation and this data is kept by the liaison officer. He commented that it was important to remember that of the 22,000 Maori in Rotorua, only 10% are offending, but that this was of great concern to the Maori community.

Rotorua Area has had a Maori Advisory Group since 2000. This group met four times per year. There was also a Maori Advisory Group at the District level. The role of the Area Advisory Group was to raise any concerns they have with the Police, and, more recently, to look at ways to get more involved in projects which reduce Maori offending.

The District Advisory Group was also concerned about the level of burglary, particularly in terms of their responsibility as hosts to the thousands of tourists who have come to Rotorua in the last 150 years.

<sup>4</sup> Described in Section 5.1.2.

The Iwi Liaison officer sees his role as maintaining partnership between the Police and Maori. Also, he commented that many partners share responsibility for keeping the community safe. He has developed a range of presentations which he has delivered on marae, schools and even at Forestry workplaces. In these sessions he talks about the rate of Maori offending and some of the issues which are behind that, such as the use of alcohol. Sixty percent of the offences, according to him, are alcohol related.

The Area Commander believes the advisory group is very valuable. He said that they were currently reworking the Memorandum of Understanding to provide the committee with a wider role. This may include sponsoring projects which aim to directly impact on the offending and victimisation of Maori. One of the issues he raised was that many young Maori offenders do not understand or know about their tribal affiliations or tikanga. They don't necessarily respect their elders or their cultural identity. This is a new phenomena in such a strongly Maori-identified region.

A programme under consideration in 2004 was having kaumatua provide a mentor role for young Maori offenders when they are charged and interviewed. The aim would be to establish a trusting relationship which could be built on to support the young person. They would need to source some funding for this and perhaps training.

The strengths identified were the well-established programmes in the Area which have successfully worked with Maori recidivist offenders.

## **9.2 Community burglary reduction initiatives**

### **9.2.1 Community renewal**

Rotorua was one of five areas involved in the Housing New Zealand Community Renewal programme. The Rotorua Fordlands community was selected as it was considered one of the poorest areas in Rotorua, with predominantly Housing New Zealand housing and transitory residents. Police also identified the area as having a greater crime problem than most other Rotorua communities. The overarching goal of the programme was to strengthen the community by addressing community issues regarding employment, health, education, safety and social service delivery.

### **9.2.2 Education and truancy initiatives**

Many respondents discussed the strong correlation between school non-attendance, particularly truancy, and crime in Rotorua, with Maori overrepresented in truancy figures.

The Rotorua District Truancy Service was a Ministry of Education funded initiative, with a truancy officer working from each secondary school in Rotorua. A truancy officer's role involved:

- monitoring school attendance
- following up non-attendance, including home visits

- patrolling the city centre and other areas young people congregated.

City Patrol, Community Watch Patrol (see Section 6.2.1, Community patrols, for further information) and Rotorua Police, when possible, also assisted with these patrols.

### **9.3 Other justice sector responses to burglary**

Other justice sector responses to burglary included initiatives within CYF, and the Department of Corrections' Community Probation Service.

#### **9.3.1 Youth Justice Family Group Conferences**

The CYF Youth Justice section was responsible for working with young offenders, their families and whanau, relevant community agencies and other professionals. When Police apprehended a suspected youth offender, they received a warning, received a Police referral to a FGC, or were arrested. A young person was only eligible for a Youth Justice FGC if they admitted committing the offence, as this was a required component of accepting responsibility for their actions. The Rotorua Youth Services Supervisor reported that approximately 75% of the youth they saw for Youth Justice FGCs were burglary offenders, though burglary might not be the offence they were referred for.

A Youth Justice FGC is a formal meeting between the young offender, members of their family group/whanau/hapu/iwi, the victim, Police, and sometimes a social worker or youth advocate, to decide how the young offender will be held accountable and encouraged to take responsibility for their behaviour. Victim involvement was voluntary.

Some respondents felt FGCs were effective with young people who had committed one or two offences, but did not effectively address recidivist offending. The Youth Services Supervisor reported that there was a lack of community organisations to accommodate FGC outcomes, including community work and rehabilitative services. However, other community respondents commented CYF had a responsibility to fund and support appropriate local programmes.

#### **9.3.2 Community Probation Service**

The Rotorua Community Probation Service (CPS) worked with offenders typically aged seventeen and older in:

- managing their non-custodial sentences and orders imposed by the Courts (e.g. parole, supervision, and community work)
- providing reports to judges to assist sentencing and release decisions
- providing rehabilitative programmes to address the causes of offenders' continued offending.

Access to programmes was based on the risk of reoffending, and it was unlikely that a first-time burglary offender would be offered a programme. Two programmes offered to higher risk burglary offenders were Straight Thinking and Te Wairua O Nga Tangata Maori.

### **9.3.2.1 *Straight Thinking***

The Straight Thinking programme was a CPS core programme to reduce reoffending. Straight Thinking was a ten-week, 60-hour intensive cognitive skills-based programme aimed to help offenders realise the consequences of their actions, and change the thought patterns, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours that commonly led them to offend. The Rotorua CPS Manager reported that the Straight Thinking programme in Rotorua had a good completion rate.

### **9.3.2.2 *Te Wairua O Nga Tangata Maori***

The Rotorua CPS began the Te Wairua O Nga Tangata Maori programme in June 2002. The programme was a ten-week rehabilitative course to reduce reoffending, mainly with Maori former inmates or those on home detention and parole. Participants spent three days a week on a marae, covering Tikanga Maori (whanau values), whakapapa (genealogy and identity), te reo Maori and the use of mau rakau (language and culture). Other issues such as alcohol and drug abuse, violence, health, employment, and parenting were also addressed from a Maori perspective.

### **9.3.3 *Community Restorative Justice***

Mana Social Services provided restorative justice for adult offenders (17 years of age and older) in Rotorua, including offenders on diversion. The restorative justice process involved Mana Social Services facilitating a meeting between the offender and their victim/s, where the offender was brought face-to-face with their victim/s and the pain they caused. Both offender and victim/s were encouraged to have family or other support people also attend.

Prior to 2000, Rotorua Police were responsible for diversion of first-time adult offenders. During the Rotorua Police restructuring in 2000 which resulted in staff reductions, the Director of Mana Social Services recommended diversion be devolved to Mana Social Services, which was already operating restorative justice for court-referred repeat offenders. The programme became known as Rotorua Second Chance Restorative Justice Programme, and was supported by Te Arawa Trust Board.

Victims were encouraged to participate in restorative justice as it provided them the opportunity to:

- express the impact the offence had on them
- ask any questions of the offender
- have a say in what the offender should do.

It also provided a greater likelihood of receiving some reparation. Mana Social Services estimated approximately half of the burglary victims agreed to participate in a restorative justice meeting.

During the meeting a compensation package, the Reparative Plan, was developed to put things right for the victim, and address rehabilitation needs of the offender. Mana Social Services restorative justice reparative plans had a wider range of options available than the former Police diversion system and the Courts' sentencing options.

Mana Social Services was very clear about telling offenders that the judge might overturn or amend the recommendations they made, though Mana Social Services reported the judges very rarely overturned their restorative justice recommendations. Once the plan was approved by the judge, Mana Social Services' Programme Coordinator/Diversion Officer then supervised the reparative plan until its completion, and provided feedback on the offender's progress to the victim/s.

If the offender did not complete everything agreed to in the programme, they went back in front of the court for sentencing; however, Mana Social Services estimated this only occurred in about 10% of cases. Mana Social Services reported that generally reparation was provided in a more expedient manner than court-imposed reparation, as the offender had more incentive to complete the reparation plan before going before the judge for final sentencing. Offenders who had completed their reparation plan tended to receive a lighter sentence, or be discharged without conviction.

A Ministry of Justice evaluation of the Second Chance Programme, conducted in 2003, indicated that there was no significant reduction in the reoffending rate by offenders who had participated in the programme. The evaluation also found that the programme met all its other stated objectives of:

- securing the active participation of community members to take the place of victims unwilling to attend restorative justice meetings
- securing the participation of victims at meetings
- producing a restorative effect from actions such as apologies or reparation.

In the evaluation about 95% of the victims reported being satisfied with the restorative justice meeting (over half being 'very satisfied'). In addition, nine out of ten offenders completed all the elements of their plan.<sup>5</sup> Mana Social Services reported at the end of 2004 that 25 out of 225 offenders on their current list were burglars. They had thought that the courts were being harder on burglars recently and that the judges were delivering more custodial sentences than before.

## 9.4 Key Police partners

Rotorua Police have a number of key partnerships which they see as being essential to the reduction of crime. Partnerships are relationships which have been formalised to some extent, in which both parties consider the other partner essential to achieving shared goals. Networks are less formal arrangements in which a number of agencies meet to exchange information and build relationships so that they can work together on more specific projects.

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<sup>5</sup> Ministry of Justice, 2005, *The Rotorua Second Chance community Managed Restorative Justice Programme: An evaluation*, Wellington.

Two key partners identified by Rotorua Police are Rotorua District Council and Te Arawa Trust Board.

#### **9.4.1 Partnership with Rotorua District Council**

Rotorua District Council has had a partnership with the Crime Prevention Unit of the Ministry of Justice for over ten years and has supported a range of crime prevention, crime reduction and community safety measures. They supported a Safer Community Council for most of this time, but in 2004 reviewed their policies in this area and decided to take a more direct role in line with the Crime Prevention Unit's *Future Directions* review. The Council conducted a community survey in 2003 and identified that a 'safe and caring community' is by far the highest priority for Rotorua residents. This has provided the Council with an opportunity to reassess how they allocate resources in line with these priorities. The Council released a Crime Prevention and Action Plan in 2004 which states:<sup>6</sup>

*On the basis of consultation with key stakeholders, Council has agreed to pursue five areas of concern as part of a broader strategy for enhancing community safety:*

- *To foster community safety in the CBD and surrounding reserves*
- *To support initiatives which reduce tourism-related crime*
- *To support initiatives that reduce youth offending*
- *To support initiatives addressing alcohol and drug issues*
- *To support and build capacity for neighbourhood and community initiatives.*

The plan identifies a number of action plans for each of the areas described. All of the actions involve strategies developed with Rotorua Police. Recent actions have included:

- CPTED training and specific CPTED projects
- CBD surveillance monitoring
- Liquor Control Bylaw enforcement
- truancy and youth offending projects
- a restorative justice project in schools.

The partnership is kept active through briefings each month by the Area Commander to the District Council, and through designated staff attending the weekly crime meetings.

##### **9.4.1.1 Strengths and weaknesses of partnership with District Council**

The Council was very pleased with the relationship they had with the Police at the time of the interviews, and they believed it had improved from previous years. Regular meetings and high-level briefings provided ideal opportunities to raise matters of concern, and they were pleased with the strength of the partnership.

Council staff commented that they did not think that many in the Police had enough understanding or training about the nature of community groups and volunteers. There

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<sup>6</sup> Rotorua District Council, 'Summary Crime Prevention Plan and Action Plan to July 2005', p. 3.

needed to be consistency in the relationship so that this understanding could develop. They said that the community constables generally had a good understanding of community processes.

Overall, respondents in the Police and in Council were happy with the partnership. Several people said that it put into action the joint responsibility for community safety and sent a message to others that it is not all up to the Police.

#### **9.4.2 Partnership with Te Arawa and Maori organisations**

The Rotorua Police Maori Advisory Group, chaired by the Area Commander, included the Iwi Liaison officer and representatives from local iwi. The group met quarterly and:

- discussed concerns regarding Police in general
- discussed policing regarding Maori issues
- provided an opportunity for local iwi to be part of Rotorua Police's decision making
- provided Police with information concerning Maori initiatives.

The group also provided a forum to develop initiatives to reduce offending. The Rotorua Iwi Liaison officer also regularly attends Te Arawa Trust Board meetings and other hui on relevant issues.

There was a high proportion of Maori staff in the Rotorua Police, with the majority from Rotorua and having local marae connections, which the Iwi Liaison officer reported broke down many barriers. Their relationships with the Maori community often extended beyond work. The District Iwi Liaison officer believed Rotorua was a model for the rest of the country in regards to the representation of Maori in its staff, with Rotorua's Maori Police staff considered strong leaders in the Maori community.

During 2002 Rotorua was a pilot for New Zealand Police in collecting iwi and hapu information from Maori who were apprehended. The aims of this initiative were to encourage improved Maori ethnicity recording by the Police and provide information for local iwi regarding offending by their people. Thus individual iwi in partnership with Police could develop initiatives appropriate for their people.

Many people commented about the strength of the local Maori community and the number of Maori-focused programmes in the Area. Several of these programmes are regarded as being very successful; others less so. Police mentioned the shortage of projects which cater for more serious recidivist offenders rather than those at risk of offending.

Another possible barrier was the lack of clarity of the role of the advisory board, particularly as to whether they are expected to respond directly to issues raised by the Police or just provide advice. The limited time and other resources available to the advisory committee restrict their ability to respond directly to the crime problems outlined by Police.

*And I think there is the opportunity to do something like that because the wrap-around approach enabled us to mobilise Maoris. Because Maoris are strong...we have got this relationship but they ask 'what do you want us to do, or what can we do?' And we haven't caught on to what we can do because we haven't given them that particular information in the right way. So maybe there is an opportunity for us to do this kind of stuff. As a regular thing, I think that is a good idea, but we have to walk before we can run.*

### **9.4.3 Other partnerships**

The Rotorua Police described other partnerships.

- 'Hot' offenders
  - Justice
  - Corrections
  - Courts
  - CYF
  - Education
  - offender's family/whanau
  - offender's community
  
- 'Hot' Locations
  - District Council
  - Housing New Zealand
  - building industry
  - Justice
  - Safer Communities Council
  - Territorial Local Authorities
  - community patrols
  - security guards
  - closed circuit television
  - LTSA
  - insurance industry
  
- 'Hot' Victims
  - Justice
  - TPK
  - Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs
  - CYF
  - Women's Affairs
  - Health
  - Victim Support
  - ACC

#### **9.4.4 Relationships with partners**

The Police are unable to maintain strong relationships with all partners and so regional and local forums play a very important role. The Area Commander attended the Local Heads of Government Meeting (LHOGM). LHOGM provided an opportunity for central and local government representatives, including Rotorua Police, to discuss the issues affecting the different sectors and identify where resources could be shared. LHOGM, however, had experienced difficulties in sustaining regular meetings.

The Area Commander responds to invitations to brief different community sectors—such as the business associations—and will also set up meetings to raise issues of concern to the Police, such as with the judiciary or the media. A person from the District Council said:

*I think there is a lot of community goodwill. We have a high volunteering rate in the community. We have got some amazing community groups and some amazing iwi groups who really want to get on board with community safety issues. So we have got to make space and time...and then walk through it together in a partnership.*

### **9.5 Relationship with justice sector**

The justice sector representatives interviewed reported that Rotorua Police, particularly the Prosecutions Section, held open communication with them, and always cooperated with providing information, often in addition to what was required. Many justice respondents also reported that due to the relationship they had with Rotorua Police, they felt very comfortable discussing with them any differences of opinion.

Rotorua Police reported they had a good relationship with the local judges. Senior Police met with the local judges to brief them on the CRS and BRS, and introduced monthly meetings with judges to provide information on Rotorua's current crime problems. Prior to 2002, briefings with judges were approximately once a year, with Police statistics provided once or twice a year. Rotorua Police were very mindful of ensuring the information in these meetings was not shared in a prejudicial manner, recognising the judiciary's independence from the Police. The Area Controller in 2002 reported that the judges were very appreciative of this regular information, which provided them an alternative perspective to that presented by defence lawyers. Senior Police reported that this relationship between a Police Area and local judges was considered very advanced. The Rotorua Police Youth Services Manager also met with groups involved with the Youth Court (Youth Court Judge, CYF, Youth Advocates, and relevant community groups) approximately every three months to discuss the processes of the Court and any other youth offending related issues that required addressing. This regular meeting was suspended when the Area Controller left but subsequently picked up by the new Area Commander in 2004.

The main challenge for Rotorua Police's day-to-day interactions with other justice sector agencies was the high turnover of staff in the other agencies, which required frequent re-establishment of relationships and procedures. Rotorua Police were aware that the work of other agencies in the justice sector influenced the effectiveness of their burglary reduction strategies.

Rotorua Police believed other justice sector agencies did not regard burglary as seriously as Police, which created difficulties in coordinating burglary reduction efforts. This was particularly pertinent with the Courts, who Police believed treated burglary and receiving stolen property as minor offending, and tended to hand down penalties at the minimum end. Police reported that these penalties did not acknowledge the impact burglary had on victims, particularly when ordered reparation was not paid, nor did they serve as a deterrent for reoffending, with even highly recidivist burglary offenders rarely receiving a jail sentence

In 2004 the Area Commander spent several months arranging a meeting with the judiciary to brief them on the new policing direction, and in particular on the approach they were taking on burglary and domestic violence. The Police were attempting to get convictions for domestic assaults whether the victim appeared in court or not. They were treating it more along the lines of a homicide, where the victim was unable to appear in court. According to the Area Commander the judges were in agreement with this policy, but only a few weeks later a judge dismissed a case where the victim did not appear.

*But then in spite of all that and the talk about family violence, I got a report from a cop yesterday who is really frustrated and saying, what is the point? I came into court on my day off, the complainant didn't turn up. I had done all this stuff with the family. I knew that the complainant was always going to be a bit dodgy so we had other evidence to cooperate the charge, but as soon as the judge found out that the complainant wasn't there, he dismissed it. So what is the point? So I need to go back and... The judicial briefing had gone well and then we get this case. Exactly the sort of situation we had talked about.*

# 10 Crime statistics

## 10.1 Introduction

Crime data analysis is a component of the three-year evaluation examining the effectiveness of Police practice in relation to dwelling burglary. This is intended to supplement other information sources within each case study Police Area, such as interviews with key respondents, household surveys, victim interviews and offender interviews.

The main focus of the crime data analysis is to examine the incidence and resolution of dwelling burglary to assist the evaluation's assessment of the effectiveness of the dwelling burglary initiatives. Dwelling burglary, however, is not a crime that occurs in isolation. Dwelling burglary offenders are also often convicted for non-dwelling burglaries and other dishonesty or property crimes. The report therefore also examines other offences to provide a general crime profile for the Police Area and establish whether dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in other crimes in the Area (crime type diffusion or displacement, respectively)<sup>7</sup>. The recorded rates of crime in the Police Area are compared to those for New Zealand overall to establish whether any trends or changes within the Police Area were more likely due to Area initiatives or national trends.

This section begins with an examination of the composition of crime, followed by an examination of recorded crime for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

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<sup>7</sup> The crime data analysis was to include an examination of dwelling burglary locations within each Police Area to assess whether location-focused dwelling burglary initiatives may have resulted in a reduction or increase in dwelling burglary in other locations within the Police Area (spatial diffusion or displacement, respectively). The New Zealand Police map-based policing system (MAPS) can produce maps indicating the locations of recorded crime data, reading this data from either the CARD system or the NIA system. Particular scene types (e.g. dwelling) from crime data in CARD currently, however, cannot be indicated by MAPS, whereas scene type with NIA crime data can. Unfortunately, while the Manurewa, Rotorua, Lower Hutt and Sydenham Police Areas entered large proportions of their recorded dwelling burglaries for 2002 into NIA, only small proportions of these had a geographical coordinate assigned to their NIA record. The MAPS system, however, requires the geographical coordinates in order to map the crime incidents to their locations. Furthermore, although MAPS graphically indicates the location of incidents within suburb and even mesh block boundaries, it cannot currently extract the dataset grouped by either suburb or mesh block. Therefore, it was not possible to do this analysis.

The analysis of recorded dwelling burglary offences includes a five-year historical review and an examination of monthly trends from 2000 to 2004.

Offence clearances involve the identification of the alleged offender/s responsible for a particular offence, but do not necessarily mean they are prosecuted or convicted of that offence (for example, they may be warned, cautioned, or referred to Police Youth Aid). Following the examination of recorded crime is an examination of the recorded clearances for:

- total crime
- offence categories (the seven main categories of crime)
- dishonesty offences
- burglary
- dwelling burglary.

This section concludes by examining trends in prosecutions, convictions and sentences for burglary, both nationally and within the court district which is closest to the Police Area. The data for this section was obtained from the Case Monitoring System through the Justice Data Warehouse.

### **10.1.1 Data from New Zealand Police used in this report**

Official Police recorded crime statistics and clearances data in this report was obtained from the justice sector Law Enforcement System via the Incoff Offence Calendar Detail universe of the New Zealand Police Business Objects database.

Official Police recorded crime statistics record the scene type of the location where the offence occurred, enabling the examination of official Police recorded dwelling burglary data. As the non-dwelling scene types include the 'not applicable', 'null scene', 'unknown' and 'other scene' codes, an undercount of dwelling burglaries is possible. For New Zealand overall, the 'not applicable', 'null scene' and 'other' scene codes accounted for 7.3%, 8.2%, and 6.9% of all burglaries in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively.

Population data was used to calculate the rates of recorded crime in this report. Statistics New Zealand calculated the estimated resident populations for each Police station, based on the Police station boundaries as at the 2001 census. New Zealand Police then derived the estimated resident populations for each Police Area by summing data from the stations within each Police Area. The population data are the estimated population figures as at 30 June (mid-point) each year.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The estimated resident population for a given area as at 30 June is based on the 1996 census usually resident population counts for the years 1996–2000 and the 2001 census usually resident population counts for the years 2001–2004, updated for:

- residents missed or counted more than once by the census (net census undercount)
- residents temporarily overseas on census night
- births, deaths and net migration between census night and the date of estimate
- reconciliation with demographic estimates for ages 0–9 years.

Visitors from outside the given area are excluded.

### 10.1.2 Interpreting Police recorded crime data used in this report

The crime data presented in this report is Police recorded data and not actual crime data. An incident that was reported to Police, or became known to Police by detection, and where Police believe an offence occurred is counted as a recorded offence. Changes in Police recorded crime can therefore be due not only to changes in the actual incidence of crime, but also changes in:

- the proportion of offences reported to Police
- Police recording practices
- Police practices in identifying unreported crime.

While the New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001<sup>9</sup> identified household burglary as one of the highest reported crimes to Police, an estimated 32% of New Zealand's household burglaries in 2000 were not reported. Similarly, the surveys of burglary victimisation conducted as part of the current research<sup>10</sup> conducted for this evaluation estimated 30% of household burglaries in Manurewa during 2001 and 2003 were not reported to Police.

It is imperative that crime data and analyses presented in this report are interpreted in terms of volumes of Police work, rather than accurate reflections of the true incidence of crime.

In order to conduct comparisons between the Police Area and New Zealand overall, as well as between the four Police Areas in the final report, all the crime data in the reports is presented as rates per 10,000 population, rather than absolute volumes. As an example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police-recorded dwelling burglaries, and an estimated resident population of 3,939,000. This translates to a rate of 153.4 recorded dwelling burglaries per 10,000 population, meaning that on average, for every 10,000 residents in New Zealand, 153.4 burglaries were recorded during 2002. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 153 or 154 people out of every 10,000 residents experienced a dwelling burglary during 2002, as some people experienced repeat burglaries.

Several Police key respondents interviewed in the evaluation reported that dwelling burglary victimises whole households, not just individuals. The New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001 also regards dwelling burglary as a crime against households. To reflect dwelling burglary in terms of households, but also enable comparison of dwelling burglary to other (not household-specific) crimes, recorded dwelling burglary data in the reports is presented both as rates per 10,000 population, and rates per 100 households. Using the earlier example, in 2002, New Zealand had a total of 60,404 Police recorded burglaries, and an

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<sup>9</sup> Morris, A. and Reilly, J., *New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 2001*, Ministry of Justice, 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part One (2002): Four Police Areas and national data compared*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.


Triggs, S., *Surveys of household burglary Part Two: Four Police Areas compared between 2002 and 2004*, Ministry of Justice, 2005.

estimated 1,359,843 occupied dwellings<sup>11</sup>. This translates to a rate of 44.4 recorded dwelling burglaries per 1,000 households in 2002 for New Zealand, meaning that for every 1,000 households in New Zealand, 44.4 dwelling burglaries were recorded during 2002. Note as previously, this does not necessarily mean that 44 or 45 out of every 1,000 households experienced a burglary during 2002, as some households experienced repeat burglaries.

## 10.2 Total crime

Figure 10.1 shows the total crime per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand. From 1997 to 2004, New Zealand had a lower crime rate than Rotorua for the same period.

**Figure 10.1 Total crime per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**




Overall, the total crime rate decreased in Rotorua by 0.9% from 1997 to 2004, whereas the national total crime rate decreased by 20.1%.

Figure 10.2 shows dishonesty offences and the total crime per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Dishonesty offences and crime rates were both higher in Rotorua than in New Zealand during this period.

<sup>11</sup> Statistics New Zealand provided New Zealand Police the number of occupied dwellings in each Police station area as at the 2001 census; however, they were not asked to provide the estimated number of occupied dwellings for the years 1996–2002, as they had done for the usually resident population. Therefore rates of recorded dwelling burglaries per 100 households have only been calculated for the years 2000–2004, with the 2001 census night number of estimated occupied dwellings used for each of these years.

**Figure 10.2: Dishonesty offences and total crime per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**




In Rotorua, there was an overall 2.5% increase in dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 compared to an overall decrease of 14% in the national rate. Total crime increased in Rotorua by 14.5% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 9.7% decrease in the national total crime rate per 10,000 population.

Table 10.1 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for the remaining offence categories for Rotorua and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.3 represents the data graphically.

**Table 10.1 Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**

Offence category	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Rotorua					New Zealand				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	116.9	130.5	157.3	176.3	175.4	107.8	113.4	114.1	113.8	111.4
Sexual	8.1	12.7	12.4	10.2	13.6	8.6	8.0	8.9	8.1	7.6
Drugs and antisocial	188.8	212.1	224.6	248.4	316.3	138.3	141.8	140.6	146.7	134.1
Property damage	112.2	117.9	120.3	141.4	110.8	105.0	105.0	103.7	108.9	101.8
Property abuses	66.6	62.8	71.6	73.3	76.0	54.7	55.0	55.8	52.2	48.4
Administrative	61.2	100.6	77.6	57.3	52.4	32.8	34.1	36.9	37.2	29.6

**Figure 10.3 Offence categories (excluding dishonesty) crime rates per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**



### 10.2.1 Recorded violent offences

The rate of recorded violent offences for Rotorua was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 50% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national increase of 3.3% for the same period.

### 10.2.2 Recorded sexual offences

The rate of recorded sexual offences for Rotorua was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2001 to 2004. It increased by 67.6% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 11.6%.

### 10.2.3 Recorded drugs and antisocial offences

The rate of recorded drugs and antisocial offences for Rotorua was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 67.5% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 3.0%.

### 10.2.4 Recorded property damage offences

The rate of recorded property damage offences in Rotorua was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It decreased by 1.3% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 3.0% for the same period.

### 10.2.5 Recorded property abuse offences

Rotorua's rate of recorded property abuse offences was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 14% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 11.5% for the same period.

### 10.2.6 Recorded administrative offences


Rotorua's rate of recorded administrative offences was higher than the rate for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It decreased by 14.4% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 9.8% for the same period.

## 10.3 Dishonesty offences

Table 10.2 provides the recorded crime rates per 10,000 population for particular dishonesty offences for Rotorua and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.4 represents the data graphically.

**Table 10.2: Recorded dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**

Selected dishonesty offences	Rate per 10,000 population									
	Rotorua					New Zealand				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Burglary	261.5	261.4	234.8	299.9	269.7	172.4	155.5	153.3	153.7	142.0
Unlawful taking/ conversion M/vs	71.1	73.0	63.1	79.9	80.9	57.0	52.1	56.2	54.2	47.9
Remaining car conversion	64.7	54.7	51.5	61.3	47.8	41.0	40.3	42.4	43.2	34.7
Theft ex car	181.4	205.4	189.2	192.8	191.7	121.8	127.8	136.2	132.8	114.9
Theft ex dwelling (no drugs)	18.8	20.4	22.8	25.7	15.4	20.3	20.6	21.2	18.8	14.4
Remaining theft	256.9	298.3	269.1	295.4	282.7	186.9	187.6	186.6	182.7	167.7
Receiving/possessing stolen goods	9.1	9.4	9.3	11.2	9.4	7.1	6.3	6.0	6.2	5.7
Remaining dishonesty offences	50.0	61.6	49.5	61.9	37.8	53.9	51.4	55.5	44.9	39.6

**Figure 10.4: Recorded dishonesty offences per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**

### 10.3.1 Recorded burglary offences

Rotorua's recorded burglary offences accounted for 27.9% of Rotorua's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004, whereas nationally burglary accounted for 24.6% of total recorded dishonesty offences.

The recorded burglary rate per 10,000 population was higher in Rotorua than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 3.1% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 17.6%.

### 10.3.2 Recorded car conversion offences

Unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles accounted for 7.7% of Rotorua's total recorded dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004 and 8.5% of the total recorded dishonesty offences in New Zealand for the same period.

The recorded unlawful takings/conversion of motor vehicles rate per 10,000 population was higher in Rotorua than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. It increased by 13.9% from 2000 to 2004, compared to a national decrease of 15.9%.

### 10.3.3 Recorded theft offences

Theft offences accounted for 51.9% of both Rotorua's and New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004.

Theft ex car is the offence term for the stealing of property from a car. Theft ex car accounted for 20% of both Rotorua's and New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences from 2000 to 2004. Theft ex car offence rates per 10,000 population for Rotorua increased by 5.7% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates, which decreased by 5.7% from 2000 to 2004.

Theft ex dwelling offences accounted for 2.2% of Rotorua's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Nationally, theft ex dwelling offences accounted for 3.0% of New Zealand's total. Theft ex dwelling offence rates per 10,000 population for Rotorua decreased by 17.8% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates, which decreased by 29.1%.

Remaining theft offences<sup>12</sup> accounted for 29.5% of Rotorua's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Nationally, remaining theft offences accounted for 28.8% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004. Remaining theft offence rates per 10,000 population for Rotorua increased by 10.0% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates, which decreased by 10.3%.

#### **10.3.4 Recorded receiving or possessing stolen goods offences**

The total recorded number of receiving or possessing stolen goods offences accounted for only a small percentage of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004, for both Rotorua and New Zealand (1%).

#### **10.3.5 Recorded remaining dishonesty offences**

Recorded remaining dishonesty offences includes receiving drugs, money laundering, financial transaction opportunities and fraud. The total recorded number of remaining dishonesty offences for Rotorua accounted for 5.5% of the total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004, and it accounted for 7.7% of New Zealand's total recorded number of dishonesty offences for 2000–2004.

Remaining dishonesty offence rates per 10,000 population for Rotorua decreased by 24.4% from 2000 to 2004, compared to the national rates, which decreased by 25.7% from 2000 to 2004.

### **10.4 Burglary**

Figure 10.5 shows the recorded burglary rates per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand from 1997 to 2004. For both Rotorua and New Zealand, there was generally a decreasing trend in burglary from 1997 to 2002. Overall, from 1997 to 2004, burglary decreased in Rotorua by 11.9% and nationally by 33.7%.

<sup>12</sup> Remaining theft offences included: theft ex drugs; theft ex shops; theft (pillage); theft ex person; general theft; and theft as servant/misappropriation offences.

**Figure 10.5: Recorded burglary per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**





Figure 10.6 examines the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population from 1997 to 2004 for Rotorua and New Zealand.

**Figure 10.6: Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**




Rotorua's dwelling burglary rates were higher than the national dwelling burglary rates and there was a 23.1% increase in dwelling burglary in Rotorua from 1997 to 2004, whereas nationally there was a 31.1% decrease over the same period.

When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, dwelling burglary rates in Rotorua increased by 15.8%, whereas nationally there was a 15.4% decrease.

Non-dwelling burglary rates were also higher in Rotorua than in New Zealand. There was a 46.0% decrease in non-dwelling burglary rates in Rotorua from 1997 to 2004, whereas nationally there was a 37.8% decrease over the same period.

When a comparison is made between 2000 and 2004, non-dwelling burglary rates in Rotorua decreased by 17.0%, whereas nationally there was a decrease of 21.3%.

**Figure 10.7: Rates of dwelling burglary per 100 households<sup>1</sup> for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**



1 The total number of private dwellings as at the 2001 census was used to calculate the rates per 100 households for each of the years 2000 to 2004, as estimates for the 2002, 2003 and 2004 years were not available.


Figure 10.7 examines the rate of dwelling burglary per 100 households for Rotorua and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Rotorua's rate of recorded dwelling burglary per 100 households was higher than the national rate from 2000 to 2004.

When Rotorua's recorded dwelling burglary rate is examined as a rate per 100 households, there was an increase of 14.6% from 2000 to 2004, while the rate per 100 households decreased by 13.4% nationally.

## 10.5 Clearances

Table 10.3 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared for each offence category and total crime for Rotorua and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.8 presents the percentage data graphically.

**Figure 10.8: Percentage of recorded offences cleared by offence category for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**



The total clearance rate for Rotorua was higher than the national rate only in 2004.

**Table 10.3: Crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded crimes cleared by offence category for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**

Offence category	Rotorua (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Violence	116.9 (107.8)	130.5 (113.4)	157.3 (114.1)	176.3 (113.8)	175.4 (111.4)	70.2 (76.6)	68.9 (77.2)	69.0 (77.8)	78.3 (79.9)	83.3 (80.6)
Sexual	8.1 (8.6)	12.7 (8.0)	12.4 (8.9)	10.2 (8.1)	13.6 (7.6)	35.1 (53.8)	75.3 (52.1)	41.4 (57.2)	51.4 (56.0)	62.5 (55.9)
Drugs and antisocial	188.8 (138.3)	212.1 (141.8)	224.6 (140.6)	248.4 (146.7)	316.3 (134.1)	78.1 (89.6)	80.6 (88.3)	85.0 (88.6)	88.2 (90.5)	93.2 (91.6)
Dishonesty	913.4 (660.4)	984.4 (641.6)	889.3 (657.3)	1036.2 (636.8)	936.1 (567.8)	19.0 (22.6)	19.5 (22.7)	22.5 (22.5)	23.1 (23.1)	24.8 (23.8)
Property damage	112.2 (105.0)	117.9 (105.0)	120.3 (103.7)	141.4 (108.9)	110.8 (101.8)	28.8 (31.4)	26.8 (31.2)	33.0 (30.3)	34.4 (31.1)	38.1 (31.6)
Property abuses	66.6 (54.7)	62.8 (55.0)	71.6 (55.8)	73.3 (52.2)	76.0 (48.4)	70.9 (68.3)	56.0 (67.3)	61.8 (69.0)	64.6 (72.5)	78.5 (73.2)
Administrative	61.2 (32.8)	100.6 (34.1)	77.6 (36.9)	57.3 (37.2)	52.4 (29.6)	91.2 (85.8)	62.8 (84.3)	65.9 (86.3)	73.5 (88.6)	87.3 (91.4)
Total crime	1467.4 (1107.6)	1621.1 (1099.0)	1552.9 (1117.4)	1743.2 (1103.7)	1680.6 (1000.5)	36.9 (41.4)	36.5 (42.0)	41.2 (41.9)	42.5 (43.5)	49.4 (44.6)

## **10.5.1 All crime**

### ***10.5.1.1 Recorded clearances for violent offences***

Recorded clearance rates were lower in Rotorua for violent offences than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2003 but not in 2004. Recorded clearance rates increased by 18.7% in Rotorua from 2000 to 2004, while national clearance rates increased by 5.2% over the same period.

### ***10.5.1.2 Recorded clearances for sexual offences***

Recorded clearance rates in Rotorua were lower than in New Zealand during 2000, 2002 and 2003, and were higher in 2001 and 2004. Recorded clearance rates increased by 78.1% in Rotorua from 2000 to 2004, while national clearance rates increased by 3.9% over the same period.

### ***10.5.1.3 Recorded clearances for drugs and antisocial offences***

Recorded clearance rates for drugs and antisocial offences were lower in Rotorua than in New Zealand from 2000 to 2003 but were higher in 2004. In Rotorua, there was an increasing trend in clearance rates from 2000 to 2004 of 19.3%. Nationally, there was an increase in clearance rates for drugs and antisocial offences of 2.2% over the same period.

### ***10.5.1.4 Recorded clearances for dishonesty offences***

Recorded clearance rates for dishonesty offences were lower in Rotorua than in New Zealand in 2000 and 2001, and were higher in 2004. In Rotorua, clearance rates increased from 2000 to 2004 by 30.5%. Nationally, the rate of recorded clearances increased by 5.3% from 2000 to 2004.

### ***10.5.1.5 Recorded clearances for property damage offences***

Recorded clearance rates for property damage offences in Rotorua were lower than in New Zealand during 2000 and 2001, and higher from 2002 to 2004. In Rotorua, clearance rates increased from 2000 to 2004 by 32.3%. Nationally, clearance rates increased by 1%.

### ***10.5.1.6 Recorded clearances for property abuse offences***

Recorded clearance rates for property abuse offences in Rotorua were higher than in New Zealand during 2000 and 2004, and lower from 2001 to 2003. In Rotorua, clearance rates increased from 2000 to 2004 by 10.7%. National clearance rates increased by 7.2%.


### ***10.5.1.7 Recorded clearances for administrative offences***

Recorded clearance rates for administrative offences were lower in Rotorua than in New Zealand from 2001 to 2004 but were higher in 2000. In Rotorua, clearance rates decreased from 2000 to 2004 by 4.3%. Nationally, clearance rates increased by 6.5% between 2000 and 2004.

### 10.5.2 Dishonesty offences

Table 10.4 provides a comparison of the rate of recorded dishonesty offences per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded offences cleared for particular dishonesty offences for Rotorua and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.9 presents the data on the percentage of recorded offences cleared graphically.

**Figure 10.9: Percentage of recorded dishonesty crimes cleared for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**



**Table 10.4: Dishonesty offences crime rates per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded dishonesty crimes cleared for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**

<b>Selected dishonesty offences</b>	<b>Rate per 10,000 population</b>					<b>Rotorua (New Zealand)</b>				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
	261.5	261.4	234.8	299.9	269.7	11.2	12.5	13.8	16.0	17.9
Burglary	(172.4)	(155.5)	(153.3)	(153.7)	(142.0)	(15.8)	(16.0)	(15.9)	(16.5)	(17.3)
Unlawful taking/conversion of motor vehicles	71.1	73.0	63.1	79.9	80.9	18.2	19.4	17.4	25.4	22.2
	(57.0)	(52.1)	(56.2)	(54.2)	(47.9)	(16.9)	(18.8)	(19.4)	(20.3)	(20.1)
Remaining car conversion	64.6	54.8	51.5	61.3	47.8	19.4	14.9	29.8	19.7	30.3
	(41.0)	(40.3)	(42.4)	(43.2)	(34.7)	(22.3)	(22.6)	(25.0)	(25.9)	(25.5)
Theft ex car	181.4	205.4	189.2	192.8	191.7	5.7	3.8	11.3	6.5	6.1
	(121.8)	(127.8)	(136.2)	(132.8)	(114.9)	(6.4)	(6.6)	(7.3)	(8.0)	(7.5)
Theft ex dwelling	18.8	20.4	22.8	25.7	15.4	9.1	8.4	7.5	9.4	14.7
	(20.3)	(20.6)	(21.2)	(18.8)	(14.4)	(13.8)	(13.3)	(13.0)	(13.7)	(13.4)
Remaining theft	256.9	298.4	269.1	295.4	282.7	28.7	30.2	33.4	31.9	37.5
	(186.9)	(187.6)	(186.6)	(182.7)	(167.7)	(33.1)	(32.8)	(32.0)	(32.4)	(34.4)
Remaining dishonesty offences	59.1	71.0	58.8	73.1	47.2	56.4	52.3	48.7	57.7	66.4
	(61.0)	(57.7)	(61.5)	(51.1)	(45.3)	(50.9)	(50.4)	(48.6)	(53.3)	(52.1)

### **10.5.2.1 Recorded clearances for burglary offences**

Burglary clearance rates in Rotorua were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2003 but higher in 2004. There was a substantial increase in burglary clearances in Rotorua from 2000 to 2004 of 59.8%, compared to a 9.5% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

### **10.5.2.2 Recorded clearances for car conversion offences**

Rotorua's rate of recorded clearances was higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004, except during 2002, when they were lower. There was a 22% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to an 18.9% increase in national clearance rates.

Rotorua's rate of recorded clearances for remaining car conversion offences was higher than the national rates in 2002 and 2004, and lower during 2000, 2001 and 2003. There was a marked increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004 of 56.2%, compared to a 14.3% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

### **10.5.2.3 Recorded clearances for theft offences**

Rotorua's rates of recorded clearances for theft ex car offences were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2004, except during 2002, when they were higher. There was a 7.1% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 17.1% increase in national clearance rates.

Rotorua's rates of recorded clearances for theft ex dwelling offences were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2003 and higher in 2004. There was a 61.5% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.9% decrease in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Rotorua's rates of recorded clearances for remaining theft offences were higher than the national rates in 2002 and 2004, and lower during 2000, 2001 and 2003. There was a 30.8% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 3.9% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.


### **10.5.2.4 Recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences**

Rotorua's rates of recorded clearances for remaining dishonesty offences were higher than the national rates from 2000 to 2004. There was a 17.7% increase in clearances from 2000 to 2004, compared to a 2.3% increase in national clearance rates from 2000 to 2004.

Table 10.5 compares the rates of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary per 10,000 population and the percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for Rotorua and New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. Figure 10.10 presents the percentage of cleared dwelling and non-dwelling burglaries graphically.

**Table 10.5: Dwelling and non-dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population and percentage of dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**

Burglary	Rotorua (New Zealand)									
	Rate per 10,000 population					Percentage cleared				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
	162.8	160.5	149.7	194.8	185.9	11.6	11.3	13.1	14.3	18.8
Dwelling burglary	(106.3)	(93.4)	(93.2)	(97.3)	(89.9)	(15.3)	(15.7)	(15.2)	(16.0)	(16.3)
Non-dwelling burglary	98.7	100.9	85.1	105.1	83.7	10.4	14.3	15.1	19.0	16.1
	(66.2)	(62.1)	(60.1)	(56.4)	(52.1)	(16.7)	(16.6)	(17.0)	(17.4)	(18.9)

**Figure 10.10: Percentage of recorded dwelling and non-dwelling burglary offences cleared for the Rotorua Police Area and New Zealand**


Rotorua's recorded clearance rates for dwelling burglary were lower than the national rates from 2000 to 2003 but higher in 2004. Non-dwelling burglary clearance rates in Rotorua were higher than the national rates in 2003 but lower from 2000 to 2002 and in 2004.

Rotorua's recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary increased by 62.0% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary clearance rate increased by 54.8% from 2000 to 2004. The national recorded clearance rate for dwelling burglary increased by 6.5% from 2000 to 2004, whilst the non-dwelling burglary rate increased by 13.1% from 2000 to 2004.

## 10.6 Prosecutions, convictions and sentences

Figure 10.11 shows the outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Rotorua District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004 as a percentage of charges prosecuted. The percentage of prosecutions resulting in convictions changed very little from 1997 to 2004. Prosecutions that were not proved decreased slightly from 23.8% in 1997 to 21.9% in 2004. Prosecutions that were discharged without conviction and 'other' outcomes were a relatively minor proportion of charges prosecuted from 1997 to 2004.


**Figure 10.11: The outcomes of burglary prosecutions in the Rotorua District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004<sup>1, 2</sup>**



- 1 The outcomes of burglary prosecutions labelled 'Not proved' were comprised of 'Dismissed', 'Discharged', 'Withdrawn', 'Acquitted' and 'Other not proved'.
- 2 This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System (on the former Wanganui Computer System). This subsystem records the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem. Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution) being laid. For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault then this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person. The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not finalised in court until 2005.

Figure 10.12 shows the number of convictions for burglary in the Rotorua District and High Courts and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004. The number of burglary convictions in the Rotorua District and High Courts<sup>13</sup> increased by 64.3% from 1997 to 2004. There was a 4.1% decrease in burglary convictions nationally from 1997 to 2004.

**Figure 10.12 Number of burglary convictions in the Rotorua District and High Courts and in the New Zealand District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004<sup>1</sup>**




- 1 This data was obtained from the Case Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System (the former Wanganui Computer System). This subsystem records the court processing of charges. A database has been established consisting of depersonalised information that has been extracted from the Case Monitoring Subsystem. Every offence for which an offender is apprehended can result in a 'charge' (or prosecution) being laid. For example, if a person is apprehended for having committed two burglaries and one assault then this may result in three separate charges being laid against the person. The analysis was based on individual charges using the Final Court Hearing Date to ensure that every charge laid was finalised. For example, a charge might be laid in 2004 but not finalised in court until 2005.

Figure 10.13 shows the sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Rotorua District and High Courts from 1997 to 2004, as a percentage of cases. There was a decreasing trend in the use of community based sentences from 1997 to 2004, whereas there was an increasing trend in the use of custodial sentences for the same period. Monetary sentence trends were relatively stable between 1997 and 2001 but decreased sharply in 2002 and then gradually increased in 2003 and 2004. Other types of sentence increased from 1997 to 2001 and then decreased in 2002 and 2003, followed by an increase in 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Convictions in the Rotorua District and High Courts include convictions for offences committed in the Rotorua Police Area.

**Figure 10.13: The types of sentences imposed for burglary offences in the Rotorua Police Area from 1997 to 2004<sup>1, 2</sup>**



- 1 The types of sentences imposed were as follows: custodial (life imprisonment, preventive detention, imprisonment or corrective training); community (community work, periodic detention, community service, community programme or supervision); monetary (fines or reparation); and other sentences (e.g., a conviction and discharge, or an order to come up for sentence if called upon).
- 2 In general terms, a 'case' in this report is defined as all charges being dealt with against an offender at the same point in time. For example, if a case involves more than one charge, the charge taken to represent the case is one that resulted in the most serious penalty.

## 10.7 Summary

In the Rotorua Police Area, both the rate of recorded dwelling burglary and total crime increased from 2000 to 2004, while the national rates decreased over the same period. However, during this period the recorded clearance rates for most offences, particularly dwelling and non-dwelling burglary, in Rotorua showed marked increases which were greater than increases nationally. The number of convictions for burglary in the Rotorua District and High Courts, as well as the proportion of burglary cases resulting in a custodial sentence, also increased substantially over the period.



# 11 Perceived effectiveness of overall burglary reduction effort

## 11.1 Introduction

The BRS was introduced in part during 2002, and final elements were in place by the end of 2003. The effectiveness of the strategy was hindered during 2003 by a lack of focus and only partial buy-in from staff. It took the appointment of the new Area Commander in late 2003, the introduction of a Tactical Coordinator and the building up of the capacity of the Intel team before the whole strategy could be implemented. This was happening by mid-2004.

Rotorua Police did not have processes for adequately recording their efforts against indicators. The mechanisms identified in the strategy were being applied in a haphazard manner. Despite this the strategy was beginning to lead to results by the end of 2004. Where the strategy had been applied more thoroughly in other areas of the Bay of Plenty the figures indicated that the strategy was producing results.

Crime figures indicate that Rotorua Police were dealing with an increase in total crime (per 10,000 population) of 14% between 2000 and 2004, where nationally the crime rate decreased by 9.7% for the same period. The burglary rate reflected this and rose sharply in 2003 (by 27.7%) but then decreased again in 2004 by 10%.

The dwelling burglary rate was higher than the national average and showed a 23.1% increase from 1997 to 2004, whereas the rate nationally decreased by 31% in the same period. Dwelling burglary rates in Rotorua increased by 15.8% between 2000 and 2004. Dwelling burglary in Rotorua increased in 2003 by 30.1% and decreased in 2004 (4.6%).

Rotorua greatly improved the clearance rate for burglary in the period from 2000 to 2004—an increase of 60.5%, compared to a 9.5% increase in national clearance rates for the same period.

According to the Household Survey there had been an improvement in the public experience of crime and safety. By 2004, only 14% of respondents thought there was more crime in the past twelve months (compared with 18% in 2002), whilst 12% thought there had been less. 57% thought the level of crime was about the same.

Those victims in Rotorua with comprehensive security increased from 30% to 44% between 2002 and 2004.

Regarding satisfaction with Police service, there was an increase in the percentage of those who contacted the Police who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the service (20% to 33%). There was a corresponding drop in the percentage who were satisfied or very satisfied

(from 44% to 31%). The main reason for being dissatisfied was the service (i.e. Police not attending quickly enough or not investigating enough).

The strategies being applied by mid-2004 appear to be producing results but it will be several years before the trend downward can be confirmed in such a volatile environment.

People interviewed in this case study were asked about the overall effectiveness of Police efforts to reduce burglary. Whilst some of them refer to specific initiatives, the following were identified as being general strengths and barriers.

Figure 11.1 depicts some of the Police burglary initiatives together with changes in recorded dwelling burglary rates for the period 2000–2004. While a wide range of factors impact on burglary rates, it gives a picture of what happened to dwelling burglary rates as changes occurred in the Police Area. It illustrates monthly and moving averages of recorded dwelling burglary rates per 10,000 population for the Rotorua Police Area and for New Zealand from 2000 to 2004. The trend line shows dwelling burglary gradually decreasing from July 2000 to April 2002, gradually increasing from April 2002 to January 2004 and then gradually decreasing again from January 2004 to October 2004. Compared to Rotorua, the national recorded monthly and moving average dwelling burglary rate per 10,000 population fluctuated less markedly from 2000 to 2004.

## 11.2 Barriers to effectiveness

The main barriers identified were:

- attendance time
- ability to sustain initiatives
- staff level and flexibility
- funding
- staff attitudes and leadership
- internal systems.

The relationship with Comms, court implementation of bail conditions, and inadequate sentencing were also identified as barriers to reducing burglary.


### 11.2.1 Attendance time

Many Police were unhappy about the length of time it took to attend burglaries, which they said was due to the higher priority given to, and the volume of, more serious offences.

*Yes if we are busy, if we are at a job already, then the burglary job will come into the system and someone will dispatch us when we become free. It is usually me because I am a Q-car today and my job is to attend burglaries. I won't say it is not high priority because burglaries are. But when things like domestics or something that is happening right now, we are sent to those to try and help deal with that at that time. So I think burglaries sometimes are put on the back burner really.*

**Figure 11.1 Quarterly rates (moving averages) of recorded dwelling burglary per 10,000 population for Rotorua Police area and New Zealand**

**Monthly rates and moving averages (2000-2004)**



Some frontline Police believed that there should be one group responsible for attending burglaries and that they should be ring-fenced from other duties. They would then have time to complete the ORs as well as conduct enquiries in the neighbourhood.

### **11.2.2 Ability to sustain initiatives**

The new burglary reduction efforts were added to existing policing requirements, without additional resourcing provided. The CRS asserted that the reductions in crime as a result of these efforts would, over time, reduce policing requirements. The proactive work, however, had to be sustained long enough to obtain sufficient crime reduction to result in reduced policing requirements, and there was concern that this sustainability might not be achievable:

*if you reduce the amount of burglary, in time, provided we can hang in there long enough, the other types of criminal offending will reduce as well, this will free up more people to be more proactive, and that's what we're basing it on. I am just not sure whether we can sustain the burglary focus long enough and effectively enough to get to that point given the other pressures that exist.*

Rotorua Police discussed several factors that threatened the sustainability of their burglary reduction efforts:

- reactive policing demands and other policing requirements
- staff in burglary-focused positions often being called upon to relieve or assist staff in other sections
- time-intensive activities, such as execution of search warrants and directed patrolling, often being impossible to conduct during short-staffed shifts
- time in the Strategic Section increasingly being used to cover for leave, training days, prison escorts and court work
- ongoing policing commitments, such as file work, which could be delayed for short periods but could not be delayed long-term.

*The old concept was criminals didn't drive through at night because they got stopped all the time, and they know that because we speak to them all the time. If you are dealing with them all the time they will talk to you in general conversation. We drive around all the time now, it is not an issue because you guys hardly ever stop us. So if we allow them that amount of freedom and leeway to move stuff and do things, it will happen. That pressure must be constant. They must believe they are going to get stopped if they are driving to town especially at night or during the day, or whatever. Targeting the groups is fine but we need to know these groups. We know where they are, but that is all.*

### **11.2.3 Staff levels and flexibility**

All Rotorua Police and community respondents interviewed referred to Rotorua Police's ongoing staffing difficulties. Prior to the restructuring, Rotorua Police felt their crime reduction efforts were hampered by staff shortages, which were exacerbated further by mandatory leave, training day requirements, and secondments to District Police and other Police Areas:

*The weakness is that the staff is spread very thinly. If there is an area that is short of staff it can affect the whole function of the station.*

Some Rotorua Police reported they did not have sufficient staffing resources for the additional burglary-focused work. The District Commander, however, believed that similar to other Police Areas, Rotorua could produce sustained significant reductions in burglary without extra resourcing, with a reorganisation of their policing practices and the inclusion of community partners being sufficient to bring success. He also believed that by utilising a whole-of-Police approach to crime reduction, efficiencies would be achieved, and the results of a downward crime trend would relieve the pressure.

Frontline staff complained that due to the reduced numbers on each shift, and the impact of leave, training and sickness, they were barely able to cope with the frontline work and had little time for strategic work such as enforcing liquor bans or going on targeted patrols. At the end of 2004 a new roster was designed to provide overlap on the busy nights of Thursday, Friday and Saturday. Flexibility was identified as a key aspect of the new strategy.

Due to the rosters and the need to cover for staff away, a section quite regularly comprises a Sergeant plus three. If this happened on late shift, the small numbers meant it was unlikely for Police to attend burglaries which had been in the system all day, waiting for the victims to return home from work. This caused a lag in the attendance time, compromised the quality of the scene examination and resulted in frustration on the part of the victims.

Another perspective was the frustration expressed by some frontline Police that there appeared to always be an increase in the management levels at the expense of frontline Police. Their numbers had been reduced and yet they were being expected to carry out more and more roles.

#### **11.2.4 Funding**

The importance of collecting forensic evidence was emphasised in National, District and Area directives. However, after being successful in increasing the number of voluntary and crime scene DNA samples, Rotorua staff became frustrated by DNA funding restrictions requiring them to cut back on the number of samples obtained. Rotorua Police reported this had a direct impact on their abilities to resolve burglaries, and was financially short-sighted, as a relatively small DNA investment now could save months of investigation costs later.

#### **11.2.5 Staff attitudes and leadership**

Many Police interviewed mentioned that the attitude of some staff was having an impact on their effectiveness. Some people said that there was resistance to change by some Police who had been in the service for many years and who had been proud of Rotorua's Police record in the past, particularly before the restructuring. Some comments were that rather than be open to different policing methods, some people only wanted to blame the Police staff levels and the top-heavy management.

Others who were excited by new methods and could see their value felt isolated, especially if they were answerable to seniors who had this attitude. The resistant attitude manifested in various ways, such as by prioritising reactive policing over proactive crime prevention initiatives. At other times it was experienced as undermining of Police leadership, and this had a demoralizing effect on others.

*Unfortunately a lot of people believe it is hopeless, and we tell each other we can't do this and we can't do that and afterwards we start to believe it. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. I feel I want to grab a few people and give them a shake and say wake up. But again there are not too many of us, only two or three guys that can see the forest for the trees. Maybe we are the ones out of step—I don't know. But I just know that what I have done has worked and worked well...but I feel I just don't get that support be able to carry it on.*

Others commented that many people were supportive and open to new methods but felt frustrated and stressed at having so many different demands on them despite being underresourced.

*I guess the difficulty is there are so many focuses, and although they say stay focused and you might try and concentrate on the focus, but if there are eight focuses, everything is going to get blurry and hard to concentrate on. So if we have a policy of driving down burglaries, but have also got theft ex cars, driving down family violence, bail checks, traffic targets to meet—so those that aren't flash in multi-tasking or in organisation don't do very well. Sometimes you just get in a quandary deciding what is more important, and I think people form their own opinions about what is important, and it is very difficult to change those opinions.*

### **11.2.6 Internal systems**

Initially data entry, accountability and evaluation systems were all found to be inadequate for the new demands of evidence-led policing. However, problems were quickly identified, systems developed and training initiated. By the end of 2004 systems were improving.

### **11.2.7 Relationship with North Communications Centre**

Rotorua Police believed that the quality of service from Comms was a significant barrier to apprehending burglars and providing a quality service to victims. The main complaint from Rotorua staff was the time delay from the first call to the dispatch, often 10–20 minutes, when they were able to be at a scene with dogs in five minutes under the previous system.

*We need information quickly, often we don't get that. I believe a lot of that has to do with the Comms information centre, delays in good quality information coming through, not getting through to us quick enough. The dog handlers' catch rate dropped 75% when Comms was introduced, so that gives you an idea of how poor the information is. A delay of 10–15 minutes is enough for the scent to evaporate.*

*Dogs was one of our favoured nighttime tools to catch the bad guy with a dog, particularly when they are on foot you have got a good chance if you can keep them...our job was to keep them to ground. The dog's job was to catch him. If we can't even get to the area before the bad guy is gone...in 10 minutes walking, even in a straight line you see how far you have gone if you are walking at 6–7 kms an hour. In ten minutes, you have walked a long way.*

Other complaints about Comms were:

- a lack of knowledge of the local area
- channels being linked, compromising communications in critical situations

- crucial information being lost through software issues.

### **11.2.8 Inadequate sentencing of burglary offenders**

Despite the good relationship with local justice agencies and judges, Rotorua Police still expressed frustration at the sentences being delivered by the courts. One approach the Police were pursuing was to change the perspective from burglary being a property offence to it being a crime against the person. This would provide an opportunity to lay the charge indictably rather than summarily and lead to more serious sentences<sup>14</sup>.

### **11.2.9 Court implementation of bail conditions**

When an offender is arrested, the officer in charge of the case prepares an arrest file for that offender. The file goes to the prosecution section and the officer in charge asks for bail conditions for that person. Some commented that this should be automatically done by Police Prosecution Section. As soon as a burglar appears in court, automatic bail conditions should apply.

*Sometimes junior staff that aren't aware, or haven't had proper supervision and they take a file through and it doesn't happen. So there need to be checks and balances so that the Prosecution section ensures that bail conditions are imposed. Then also, we shouldn't have to ask for it—the judges should be automatically putting conditions on them. If you are arrested for burglary you should automatically be on some form of compulsory monitoring system by the Police or somebody until you are charged and heard.*

## **11.3 Strengths of Rotorua burglary reduction effort**

Respondents identified as strengths to Rotorua's overall burglary reduction effort:

- strong leadership
- dedicated staff
- collaborative accountability
- working to targets
- training
- strong community and justice sector relationships
- assistance from District Police.

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<sup>14</sup> *Criminal Jurisdiction*

The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the following criminal matters:

- summary offences (historically known as misdemeanours) with no option but to be tried summarily (less serious criminal offences, tried by judge without a jury or sometimes by two Justices of the Peace)
- indictable offences (historically known as felonies) triable summarily (more serious offences including offences with an option to be heard by a judge alone)
- summary offences triable indictably (less serious offences with jury trial option rights)
- the preliminary hearing of indictable offences (deposition hearing—a hearing to decide if there is enough evidence to put a person on trial).

### **11.3.1 Strong leadership**

Effective leadership is a key element of the new strategy and the challenge for Rotorua was to appoint leaders into significant roles—such as Intel and Tactical Coordination—and to influence the existing leaders within the station.

Many Rotorua Police staff commented in 2002 on the strength of having the new Bay of Plenty District Commander, who had refocused the District's crime reduction efforts by having the Police Areas identify what was working and what was not. Several staff reported that the District Commander's enthusiasm was very inspiring, with a lot of positive change already implemented in the short time he had been there. Between the formulation of the new strategy and the appointment of the new Area Commander late in 2003, the Rotorua Area was without overall consistent leadership and this caused a halt in the implementation of the BRS.

Despite this there were some successful initiatives undertaken by LET and strategic teams to target the worst offenders, and this resulted in about thirty custodial sentences for the group identified.

When the new Area Commander took up the position in late 2003, he identified the need to strengthen the senior management team. This was done through the establishment of the Tactical Coordinator at a senior sergeant level and the appointment of a new OC Intel. The challenge for 2004 was to embed the changes put in place in the previous years and start producing results.

### **11.3.2 Dedicated staff**

District and Senior Area Police felt that the burglary reduction achieved during 2002 was attributable to the dedication of the Rotorua Police staff, particularly the LET, CSA, Field Officers, and Strategic Section. Senior Police also acknowledged the support that staff in other sections gave to the burglary reduction efforts, in particular the community constables, GDB, and CIB taking on increased workloads in order to sustain the other sections' burglary reduction efforts.

The District Commander was pleased with the Rotorua staff achieving a lot of structural changes and improvement in a short period of time and with their overall support of the changes and introduced targets. He felt they were motivated to produce good results, and were keen to improve where they could.

Many staff members embraced the new direction and were pleased about having the focus to their work. When the burglary rate drops even a little it frees up Police resources to concentrate on the proactive side of policing.

### **11.3.3 Collaborative accountability**

Having every Police section in Rotorua accountable on a weekly basis for the burglary reduction efforts was considered a strength of Rotorua's BRS. The integrated approach was assisted by the weekly Area focus and crime meetings and the central role of Intel in

providing information, direction, and coordination to the burglary effort. This meant that individual sections were not left to try different strategies in isolation from each other, and units were aware of the roles others were playing.

*They report back from the previous week on how they have achieved on those tasks agreed last week. Then Intel presents normally two problems although sometimes it is three. They say look this is where the crime problems are at the moment, let's sit down, and work on a briefing paper. They will describe the problem and make some suggestions as to how they think it could be resolved, some tactics about that, and we will discuss it.*

#### **11.3.4 Working to targets**

Rotorua and District Police believed working to weekly targets increased and maintained Rotorua Police's focus on burglary reduction. The targets also enabled the quick identification of effective initiatives and those that required improvement. The weekly feedback it provided kept staff motivated.

Bail checks on targeted offenders were regarded by the Rotorua Police as a key aspect of the strategy. A target of 200 bail checks per week was implemented in early 2003, and despite initial resistance that target was often exceeded by the middle of 2003. In 2004 these measures were routinely being implemented.

#### **11.3.5 Training**

The BRS identified the need to increase the capacity of Intel to drive the new strategic direction. Intel staff were very pleased with the training and support they had been provided in 2004. The OC Intel and the Intel analyst had both completed the training in Wellington and received high commendations. The national Intel training officer also spent one month back in the Rotorua Intel office to make suggestions about how the information systems could be improved and used more effectively.

Staff commented on the greatly improved information they were receiving at the focus meetings.

The District Commander organised leadership conferences regularly and many of the senior staff from Rotorua attended one held in April 2004. This was designed by the District Intel Manager, who had a military background. She set practical problem-solving exercises which required different groups to collaborate in order to be able to address the problem. Many people mentioned the benefit of seeing the interrelation between Intel and the tactical deployment of staff. It also resulted in better use of crime meetings, with people being able to ask for more specific data from Intel and designing better approaches. This was an area which was identified as requiring ongoing input.

*I would have to say that as a result of that exercise, it would have to be one of the best examples I have ever seen of transfer of training to workplace and life. Because the next week when we had our Crime Planning meeting, people were showing confidence, people that hadn't shown it before, and we had some really good discussions, and some really good decisions came out. I asked some of the sergeants afterwards is it just me or do you think people have really benefited from that exercise we did last week*

*because I just think today's meeting went so well. And they said, no we do think it was that. So that has been really good.*

### **11.3.6 Strong community and justice sector relationships**

Rotorua Police had strong relationships with the community and justice sector agencies. These relationships enabled Police to establish burglary reduction initiatives in partnership with the community and provided support for their policing efforts. For example, Police reported that stricter bail conditions were being imposed on burglary offenders. This followed one of the monthly meetings with local judges where they discussed the high rate of offending while on bail. The relationship with the District Council was also seen to be strong, particularly in relation to the CPTED work they were collaborating on. The relationship with local iwi and Maori service providers was also said work well. So too was the work of the Advisory Panel and the Iwi Liaison officer.

### **11.3.7 Assistance from District Police**

Rotorua Police were very grateful for the increased assistance they received from the Bay of Plenty District Police, particularly in developing the burglary scan and strategy templates. During the period of research the District Police provided training, support and resources to support the Area in building up its capacity.